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This article addresses an issue with which federal courts
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a judge go about determining the content of customary
internationallaw? The article seeks to demonstrate, using the
example of the treatment of the concept of jus cogens by the
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questionable authority, on the Restatement of Foreign Relations
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of internationalcourts. The article explains the problems with
relying on such sources, and briefly describes an alternative
method of proceeding for cases involving an area of customary
international law most frequently before American courts, the
law of human rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION

More and more frequently, U.S. courts find themselves dealing
with cases that raise issues of public international law. These cases
may involve claims against foreign governments,' claims based on
acts by foreign individuals, 2 or claims against corporations alleged to
have cooperated with foreign governments.3 While such claims may
depend substantively on treaties or on federal statutes, often they
also rely on customary international law (CIL). Claims so based raise
4
a problem.

1.
E.g., Siderman de Blake v. Repub. of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1992)
(alleging eighteen causes of action against defendant Argentina).
2.
E.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 1996) (alleging
abuse under the Philippine ruler's regime).
3.
E.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1295-96 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(alleging a joint venture with a foreign government resulting in human rights
violations).
4.
Actually, they raise a whole host of problems. Perhaps the most basic
involves the place of customary international law in U.S. law. There is considerable
judicial and scholarly authority for the proposition that customary international law is
part of "the law of the United States" as that phrase is used in Article III of the
Constitution. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Marcos-Manotoc v. Trajano, 508 U.S. 972 (1993);
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To understand the difficulty, it is helpful to start with the
concept of CIL. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
describes customary international law as resulting "from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation."'5 Although this article will take issue with a number
of assertions made in the Restatement, this definition raises little
controversy. It does, however, illustrate the considerable difficulty
facing a court forced to address an issue of CIL. How does a court
determine, at the most basic level, what the various governments of
the world have done regarding a particular matter? What counts as
"practice"? How does one determine whether a practice is "general"?
Federal courts have sought to escape this morass by relying
primarily on academic writings, the Restatement, and decisions by
U.S. and international courts-and herein lies the difficulty. For,
with respect to some areas of CIL (particularly the law of human
rights, the aspect of CIL most frequently considered in U.S. courts)
neither modern academic writing nor the Restatement nor most
judicial decisions purport to derive CIL from evidence of what
governments actually do. Rather, they rely on other academic
writings, other decisions of international courts, non-binding
resolutions of international bodies, and hazy notions of natural law to
justify their assertions regarding this CIL.

Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1980); Harold Hongju Koh, Is
InternationalLaw Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825-26 (1998) (arguing
that international law should be treated as federal law); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and
Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our
Land: Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
393, 393 (1997). A number of writers, however, have challenged this position. See
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 816 (1997)
(concluding that in the absence of authorization by the federal political branches,
customary international law should not have the status of federal law); Daniel J.
Meltzer, Customary InternationalLaw, ForeignAffairs, and Federal Common Law, 42
VA. J. INT'L L. 513, 519 (2002); see generally Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of
Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986) (suggesting that the theory
of international law should focus on national political systems rather than on universal
principles); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts and International Cases, 20
YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1995) (analogizing customary international law to the law of a
foreign sovereign); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and InternationalLaw,
41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (1988) (arguing that customary international law is not
binding on the President of the United States); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the
Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 462-63 (2002). At
least one court has taken note of the controversy. See Sampson v. F.R.G., 250 F.3d
1145, 1153 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001). In any event, this dispute does not bear on the matters
discussed in this article, and is therefore not addressed.
5.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. In this article, the term "state" will
be applied in the sense in which it is normally employed in international law, that is,
as referring to independent countries.
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This article will demonstrate that the approach U.S. courts have
taken in determining the content of international law is
fundamentally flawed. This approach leads courts to treat as law
norms whose legal basis is either more circumscribed than the courts
assert or, in some cases, non-existent. More fundamentally, it
essentially converts law professors into philosopher kings, imposing
their ideas of what the law should be under the guise of describing
the law's content.
Section II will explain just how strange CIL is when viewed from
the perspective of the U.S. legal system, and discuss the difficulties of
determining the content of CIL. Section III will describe the
traditional approach taken by U.S. courts in dealing with these
difficulties. Section IV will illustrate the contemporary approach to
such matters by discussing the treatment of the concept of jus cogens
by the federal courts of appeals. The article will show that courts
have relied on doubtful authorities when forced to deal with this
concept and that some doubtful results have, not surprisingly,
followed. The final substantive section will suggest an alternative
approach for the element of CIL most frequently before U.S. courts:
international human rights law.

II. THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The more a lawyer trained in U.S. law reflects upon the concept
of CIL, the more peculiar that concept appears. CIL differs from
domestic law in a number of important respects. First, in the CIL
system, there is no sovereign with authority to control independent
states; while states are free to subordinate themselves to such an
authority, they have rarely done so. 6 Likewise, there is no court with
compulsory jurisdiction over states. 7 Instead of proceeding from a
sovereign, the law that controls the actions of states proceeds from
the group of entities that are the law's primary subjects-that is,
governments. Not only are the subjects of the law also the law
makers; they are also the law enforcers. In the U.S. system, in
contrast, law proceeds either from specific basic documents
(constitutions), or more commonly from the actions of relatively small
groups of designated individuals, legislators, administrators, or
judges, who have the legal capacity to constrain everyone in society.
Likewise, in the United States, law enforcement is a specialized
function carried out by a limited number of people.

6.
See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 206.
7.
See John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of International Law:
From State Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT'L L. J. 433, 442 (1997).
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A second difference between CIL and domestic law lies in the
formality of the domestic law-making process. A legislature acts only
when it is formally in session and according to the limitations of the
relevant constitution and its own rules. Informal actions by
legislators acting as individuals thus have no impact on the law-if,
by coincidence, every member of the legislature of, for example, North
Carolina happened to be simultaneously exceeding the speed limit, no
one would argue that North Carolina's traffic laws had been altered.
CIL, however, is derived from the individual actions of
governments which may be undertaken in any type of setting and for
reasons having little to do with the impact of those actions on
international law. For example, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of sentencing a person to death for a crime
committed prior to that person's seventeenth birthday, 8 that action
amounted to an instance of state practice which weakened any
argument that CIL forbids governments to impose the death penalty
for crimes committed when the perpetrator is as young as sixteen.
However, nothing in the opinion of the Court suggested any concern
with or even awareness of the impact of its decision on CIL.9
A third, and especially important, difference between CIL and
domestic law in the United States is that violations of CIL may lead,
not only to some form of legal sanction, but also to a change in the
content of the law.' 0 Such a result is so contrary to that which would
be obtained under a domestic legal system that it requires careful
explication. It must be stressed that this outcome is a necessary
consequence of the way in which CIL is made. As pointed out above,
CIL derives from the practice of states, even when that practice is
not, in the first instance, undertaken because of its legal implications.
Hence, any act by a government may simultaneously be analyzed
under existing CIL and as what amounts to a legislative act. Thus,
acts conforming to existing rules are not simply unremarkable
instances of obedience to law; they are examples of practice
reinforcing that law. Similarly, acts contrary to existing law can be
characterized as violations of that law, but can also be seen as what
amount to votes either to "repeal" the existing rule or to modify that

8.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
9.
Both the opinion of the court and the dissent in Stanford take note of the
practice of other countries with respect to execution of juveniles, with the court
characterizing such practice as irrelevant. Id. at 369, n.1. The dissent gives weight to
that practice. Id. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Neither opinion, however, speaks
in terms of CIL.
10.
Professor D'Amato has also discussed this phenomenon. See Anthony
D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110,
1112-27 (1982); ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

93-94 (1971) [hereinafter CONCEPT OF CUSTOM] (proposing that the only way
customary international law can change is by giving legal effect to departures from
preceding customary norms).

1480

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36.'1475

rule in some way. It is frequently asserted that violations of CIL have
no effect on the content of that law, just as domestic law is unaffected
by acts violating it." Such assertions, however, rely on a false
analogy. Private persons violating domestic law do not act as
legislators when they act; with regard to CIL, however, states are
always acting as legislators. Hence, acts contrary to law at the time
they are done may, if emulated by other states, lead to a change in
the law.
An example of this phenomenon is provided by the law of the sea.
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas 12 described itself as codifying
CIL.' 3 It defined the "high seas" as including all waters seaward of a
state's territorial sea, and guaranteed freedom of fishing in this area
to all states. 14 Yet this rule of CIL, even though codified in a treaty,
was altered by state practice within about thirty years. By the end of
that period, so many states had proclaimed their right to deny
freedom of fishing in zones extending far beyond their territorial seas
that it became impossible to deny that CIL had been altered. That is,
actions violating CIL (and, for that matter, a treaty) cumulated to
15
change the law.
In addition to these differences, CIL is supposed to derive from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation. This concept of state practice raises its own
problems. For example, what counts as state practice? What is the
consequence if some types of behavior engaged in by one state are
inconsistent with other behavior of that same state?
One way to address these issues is to ask why a customary
practice ought to be law. That is, is there some non-arbitrary
justification for ascribing binding effect to a general and consistent
practice? Perhaps the most plausible answer to this question is
Professor Starke's:
Recurrence of the ... practice tends to develop an expectation that, in
similar future situations, the same conduct or the abstention therefrom
will be repeated. When this expectation evolves further into a general
acknowledgment by states that the conduct or the abstention therefrom

11.
Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 n.15 (2d Cir. 1980); Louis B.
Sohn, The InternationalLaw of Human Rights: A Reply to Recent Criticism, 9 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 347, 350 (1981) (asserting that the number of violations of international rules is
not greater than the number of violations of domestic laws in major U.S. cities).
12.
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
13.
Id. pmbl.
14.
Id. arts. 1, 2.
15.
For a fuller discussion of changes in the law of the sea regarding fishing,
see Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 17-19. (1988) (providing an example of customary law
developing in a manner contrary to what a relevant treaty would suggest).
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16
may be regarded as consummated.

...

to custom

If, then, the rationale for treating custom as law is that states ought
to be able to rely on the assumption that other states will behave in
the future as they have in the past, it would seem to follow that
behavior would count as practice if it is of a sort as would give rise to
reasonable expectations that it would be followed in future similar
situations. Further, if an act which would, other things being equal,
give rise to such expectations, is inconsistent with a subsequent act
which is a better predictor of future action, it would be unreasonable
to expect that future conduct would conform to the first act rather
than to the second.
These considerations facilitate addressing a particularly
important issue in connection with CIL: What effect should actions
that may be seen as proxies for behavior have on that body of law?
For example, suppose State A announces that it feels constrained by
CIL to behave in accord with Rule X. Standing alone, that
announcement may well support a reasonable expectation that State
A will abide by Rule X in the future, and should count as an item of
practice supporting the existence of Rule X. However, if it is clear
that State A in fact systematically violates Rule X, it would seem that
the net effect of State A's actions is to undermine the rule. That is, if
State A's policy is to violate Rule X, one could not reasonably expect it
to conform to the rule simply because it made a dishonest statement.
To be sure, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Military
and ParamilitaryActivities (Nicaraguav. United States) stated that:
If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule,
but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications
contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct
is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to
17
confirm rather than weaken the rule.

As will be discussed below, the ICJ's assertions regarding legal
principles in its judgments are not binding on states generally,18 but
even if the quoted language is considered simply on its merits, it is
hard to defend. Why do hypocritical statements confirm a legal
principle if the law-making process is one in which legal principles
derive from conduct creating reasonable expectations? Surely, if it is
known that a given state says one thing but does another, it would
hardly be reasonable to rely on what the state says when forming
expectations.

16.
J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 38-39 (10th ed. 1989).
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98
17.
(June 27).
See discussion infra at notes 284-316.
18.
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Suppose, however, that the proxy for behavior is not simply a
statement but an adherence to a treaty requiring certain behaviorhow should this affect CIL? Regardless of its status as CIL, a rule
established in a treaty is binding on states parties to the treaty. The
question here is whether such a rule's inclusion in a treaty should
count as practice establishing a CIL obligation. In fact, it has long
been established that states often rely on treaties as evidence of state
practice for purposes of determining the content of CIL. 19 This makes
sense; it is at least as reasonable to expect that a state's future
behavior will conform to its treaty obligations as to form a similar
expectation based on a non-binding statement. However, if a state's
behavior does not conform to its treaty obligations, it would be
unreasonable to rely on the fact of treaty adherence in forming
expectations as to future actions; hence, the weight to be given to
treaty adherence as an item of state practice supporting a rule of CIL
20
would depend on a state's actual performance under the treaty.

19.
D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 10, at 113-38; R. R. Baxter,
Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary InternationalLaw, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 275, 275-76 (1968).
20.
These points are only the beginning of the consideration of treaties and
their relationship to CIL. First, it often happens that at least some provisions of a
treaty are intended to codify previously existing CIL, though an assertion to that effect
in the treaty itself can hardly be taken at face value. Second, even a treaty clearly
representing a departure from CIL may give rise to a new CIL rule, at least if states
behave as the treaty would require in situations not covered by the treaty-for
example, in transactions in which all participating states are not parties to a given
treaty. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 10, at 104-66 and authorities cited
therein. Professor D'Amato takes the position that generalizable rules in any treaty
give rise to rules of CIL that are binding upon all states, even if the treaty in question
is bilateral. Id. The foregoing statement is therefore more conservative than Professor
D'Amato's position; presumably, he would disagree with it only in that, in his view, it
does not go far enough. Third, all other things equal, the more states that are parties to
a treaty, the easier it is to make the case that practice embodied in a treaty is CIL.
Fourth, a treaty may itself negate the argument that it has any effect on CIL. Leaving
aside the question of the effect of specific statements in the treaty denying that it is
intended to embody CIL, id. at 150-62, treaties may include provisions inconsistent
with the argument that the rules of the treaty would bind the parties outside the treaty
context. For example, a treaty may limit states parties to particular types of remedies
against one another for violating the treaty; if those remedies are more limited than
those available for violations of CIL obligations, the implication of the treaty limitation
is that obligations imposed by the treaty are not duplicated by CIL obligations. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at § 901 rptr.'s note 8 (discussing the practice of the
United States regarding claims by and against foreign states). Otherwise, the treaty's
limitation on remedies could be circumvented simply by making a claim based on CIL
rather than on the treaty.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides an example of a
treaty with remedial limits having implications for CIL. The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976) [hereinafter
Covenant]. This treaty imposes numerous substantive obligations on parties to it to
protect the human rights of individuals. Id. arts. 1, 6-27. It establishes a Human
Rights Committee to perform various functions, but permits a state party to the
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If the foregoing discussion does not make clear that dealing with
CIL is difficult, perhaps that point can be made if one recalls that the
Restatement's definition of CIL calls, not only for a general and
consistent practice of states, but for practice "followed . . . from a
sense of legal obligation." 21 That is, it is not enough to know what
states have done; it is also necessary to know why they have acted.
More precisely, even if a state's acts suggest that it sees itself as
constrained in some fashion, evidence of the state's motive for
restraining itself is very important. If the state does not see itself as
legally obliged to take the action it has taken, the practice in question
simply does not support the argument that CIL imposes an obligation
to behave as the state in question has done. It is important to note,
however, that it is constraint that must be explained, not the absence
of constraint. As in domestic law, there is no need to explain why an

Covenant to complain to this committee of another state party's violations only if that
state party has consented to the Committee's hearing such complaints, and only if the
complaining state has agreed to the Committee's authority to hear similar complaints
against itself. Id. arts. 28, 41. Further, the only actions the Committee may take in
response to such a complaint are making its good offices available to the states in
question with a view toward resolving the dispute, or, with the consent of the parties,
appointing a conciliation commission for the same purpose. Id. arts. 41, 42. Further,
Article 44 of the Covenant provides:
The provisions for the implementation of the present Covenant shall apply
without prejudice to the procedures prescribed in the field of human rights by
or under the constituent instruments and the conventions of the United
Nations and of the specialized agencies and shall not prevent the States Parties
to the present Covenant from having recourse to other procedures for settling a
dispute in accordance with general or special international agreements in force
between them.
Id. art. 44. The clear implication of these provisions is that states would have no right
under the Covenant to make claims against one another for violating its provisions
outside the framework provided by Articles 41 and 42. Otherwise, the elaborate
provisions of those articles would be pointless; if one state party may make a claim
against another regardless of the second state's willingness to be subjected to such
claims, what sense would it make to require such a consent for claims made to the
Human Rights Committee, especially when claims made under the Covenant's dispute
settlement provisions can lead only to non-binding procedures? Of course, Article 44
preserves any rights states have accorded one another under other international
agreements; but that language underlines the lack of recourse in the absence of such
an agreement.
All of this is significant because it implies that the parties to the Covenant did not
see that instrument as merely codifying CIL. If CIL imposed on states an obligation to
other states to refrain from any violations of human rights, breaches of that CIL
obligation would entitle other states to claim reparation from offenders. But if such
rights existed under CIL, the Covenant's limitations on remedies would be ineffective.
The existence of those limitations on treaty remedies therefore implies an assumption
that no remedies would be available under CIL for acts which would violate the
Covenant-and the absence of CIL remedies for acts that would constitute violations of
the Covenant implies that the obligations created by the Covenant have no CIL
counterparts.
21.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 102(2).
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actor is free to act, since there is no presumption that every act must
be authorized. Rather, explanation is required for limitations on
freedom, whether they take the form of prohibitions or of duties to
act.
A U.S. judge facing a case in which CIL plays a role therefore
faces a complex task. That judge must seek to determine whether a
"general and consistent" state practice exists on the matter, while
keeping in mind the practice investigated can take many forms, and
that proof that a practice was general ten years earlier cannot
eliminate the possibility that any rule thereby established has
subsequently been undermined by contrary practice. The judge must,
furthermore, not only investigate the behavior of governments, but
must also seek to determine the motives for that behavior.22 The
question thus becomes, how have judges sought to carry out this
23
task? The next section will seek to answer this question.

22.
Id.
23.
This discussion assumes that the concept of CIL has some meaning. If it
does not, then judges would never have a basis for deciding a case in reliance on CIL,
whether derived from the types of authorities criticized in this article or in some other
manner. Some recent scholarship even questions the concept of CIL itself.
Professors Goldsmith and Posner have argued that any behavioral regularities in
state practice can be explained as the result of coincidence of interest among states,
coercion of weaker states by stronger states, bilateral cooperation resulting from a
repeating prisoner's dilemma, or bilateral coordination. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric
A. Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1120-31
(1999). Behavioral regularities coming about for such reasons do not fit the traditional
definition of CIL, they argue, because states are in such cases shaping their actions
either out of self-interest or fear, rather than out of a sense of legal obligation. Id. at
1131-33.
This view assumes that states motivated by self-interest or fear are, by definition,
not acting from a sense of legal obligation. This assumption reflects a very narrow
concept of what it means to act from a sense of legal obligation, according to which
actions taken from any motive other than a disinterested desire to comply with the law
do not count. But surely, in common practice, many individuals obey legal rules out of
fear (refraining from speeding to avoid being ticketed) or out of self-interest (making
sure that their contracts are in writing so that they will be enforceable). At least with
respect to coercion, Goldsmith and Posner would further need to show that states that
conform their actions to the demands of more powerful states do so without regard to
the legal basis for such demands. It is possible that demands seen as having a plausible
legal basis are less costly to the more powerful state than are demands with no such
basis. This could be because they attract less negative reaction from other powerful
states, or because the weaker state is less inclined to offer such resistance as it could.
In short, the argument is provocative but leaves some questions unanswered.
Professor Kelly offers an even more fundamental criticism of the concept of CIL.
See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.
449, 472-73, 475-76 (2000). He asserts that most norms characterized as rules of CIL
derive not from the general practice of states, but from the practice of a small number
of states and/or deductions by writers from sources other than the practice of states. Id.
While he acknowledges that there is considerable empirical support for certain
structural norms of CIL, he insists that there is no such empirical support for norms
imposing liabilities on states. Id. at 479-84. That is, the problem lies not in states'
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III. THE TRADITIONAL U.S. APPROACH TO CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW

The Supreme Court has seldom had occasion to consider the
proper method for determining the content of CIL, and last did so
more than a century ago. 24 Still, with caveats to be addressed below,
surely the Court's approach to the subject should carry weight with
U.S. judges.
The earliest case in which the Supreme Court appears to have
addressed the question of the manner of determining the content of
CIL was United States v. Smith.25 The defendant in that case had
been tried under a federal statute which imposed the death penalty
upon persons convicted of "the crime of piracy, as defined by the law
of nations. ' 26 The defendant argued that the statute was
unconstitutional in that it failed to define the offense of piracy other
than by reference to the law of nations. 27 The Court held that the
statute was not unconstitutional simply because its meaning
depended upon the interpretation of a term not itself defined in the
statute, stating that "Congress may as well define by using a term of
a known and determinate meaning, as by an express enumeration of
all the particulars included in that term. ' 28 The Court then addressed
the question whether the law of nations provided a reasonably certain
meaning for the term "piracy. ' 29 In this connection the Court stated
that, "What the law of nations on this subject is, may be ascertained
by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law;
by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognising [sic] and enforcing that law. 3 0° The Court proceeded to
demonstrate that the listed sources provided a clear definition of
piracy, 3 ' relying upon the opinions of well known jurists (including

motives for adhering to certain apparent behavioral regularities, but in doubt as to the
very existence of such regularities.
The only way to refute Professor Kelly's argument is to demonstrate that particular
CIL rules purporting to limit states' freedom of action have strong empirical support.
Rather than attempt to make such a demonstration in a footnote, it is enough here to
note that, if his argument is accepted, it is at least clear that U.S. courts ought not to
base decisions on purported CIL rules derived from any source other than an actual
showing of the existence of a general practice conforming to the alleged rule.
24.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
25.
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
26.
Id. at 153-54.
27.
Id. at 158.
28.
Id. at 159.
29.
Id. at 160.
30.
Id. at 160-61.
31.
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161-62 (1820).
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Grotius, Bynkershoek and Bacon),3 2 charges to juries by English
judges, and the practice of states in punishing all persons committing
33
the offense.
In consideration of Smith, it should first be remembered that
there were no international courts in 1820; the court's reference to
"judicial decisions" necessarily referred to decisions of domestic
courts. 34 Second, in context, judicial decisions were a form of state
practice; the question, after all, was how "piracy" was defined, and
one circumstance under which states would necessarily engage in
practice on the subject would have been court proceedings against
alleged pirates. 35 Finally, all of the sources on which the court relied
in Smith were consistent with one another; this was not a situation,
in other words, in which state practice on a subject differed from
jurists' opinions as to the proper interpretation of the law. 36 Indeed, it
seems doubtful that there was at that time much controversy as to
the proper definition of piracy in international law.
The Supreme Court's next discussion of the method of
37
determining the content of CIL came in The Paquete Habana.
This
famous case arose when, during the U.S. blockade of Cuba during the
Spanish-American War, U.S. naval vessels captured two small coastal
fishing boats operating out of Havana. 38 The captured boats were
adjudged by a lower federal court sitting in admiralty to be prizes of
war; they were sold, and the subsequent appeal concerned the
disposition of the sale proceeds. 39 The original owners sought to
recover the proceeds, arguing that small coastal fishing vessels could
not lawfully be treated as prizes of war under CIL.40 In addressing
this argument, the Court was obliged to explain how it determined
the content of CIL on this subject. The Court stated:
For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works
of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and
experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the
subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial
tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 163 n.8.
Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 160-61.
Id.
Id.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
Id. at 678-79.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 678-79, 686.
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law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really
41
is.

The Court then provided a fourteen-page review of state practice,
followed by an eight-page discussion of the views of prominent
writers, 42 concluding that, as a matter of international law, vessels of
43
the type in issue could not lawfully be taken as prizes.
There are several points to emphasize about this case. First, the
heart of the Court's opinion as to the content of international law was
its recital of state practice. 44 It appears that writers were quoted
primarily to demonstrate the correctness of the Court's narrative. The
language quoted above reinforces this conclusion. Jurists and
commentators, according to the Court, serve the function of providing
evidence of the customs and usages of nations because of their
knowledge of their subject.4 5 In other words, writers are important in
addressing matters of international law, not because their views as to
what the law should be carry any weight, but because they provide a
convenient catalog of the crucial element of the analysis, that is, state
practice.
Second, it seems that the method of determining the content of
CIL employed in The Paquete Habana is consistent with that
employed in Smith. To be sure, the later case stressed that the works
of publicists were relied upon only as evidence of state practice, while
the earlier case appears to treat scholarly opinion and state practice
as equally authoritative sources of law 46 But the Smith court was not
faced with any divergence between the parties regarding the weight
to be given to the opinions of writers in determining the content of
CIL (though the parties did disagree as to the substance of scholarly
opinion). 47 It was not, therefore, obliged to address the question of the
relative importance of the writers' views in determining the content
of CIL. In contrast, in Paquete Habana, appellants took the position
that the writings of publicists weighed equally with the practice of
states in determining the relevant rule of CIL.4 8 The captors of the
vessels in question, however, asserted that the views of writers were
entitled to no weight in the matter.4 9 The United States, arguing for
the legality of the capture, asserted as follows:
Reference has been made in the brief to the fact that the writers on
international law, and especially the continental writers, are far in

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 700.
The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686-700, 701-08 (1900).
Id. at 719-20.
Id. at 686-700.
Id. at 700.
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820).
Id. at 157-58.
Brief for Appellants at 8-10, The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677.
Brief for Captors at 7-8, Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677.
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advance of the law as determined by legislation or decisions, or by the
plain consensus of agreement on the part of the nations, and that they
indulge in speculations which are not justified. We are contending that
the court will regard principles fairly settled, but will not be influenced
by hypothetical views or considerations of what the law ought to be or
50
may be in the future rather than what it is.

The language from the Court's opinion quoted above was
apparently a response to disagreement among the parties as to the
weight to be given to the opinions of writers. In essence, the Court
split the difference-writers' opinions would be given weight, said the
Court, not as sources equivalent to the practice of states in
determining the content of law, but because they describe that
51
practice.
Finally, and most important, the approach taken by the Court in
Paquete Habanain determining the content of CIL fits easily with the
nature of that body of law as discussed above. 52 That is, the opinion
insisted that the source of international law was "custom", that is,
actual practice which, it could reasonably be assumed, would be
followed in the future.53 U.S. courts therefore have two reasons for
focusing on the actual practice of states in determining the content of
CIL. First, such an approach best comports with the nature of that
body of law. Second, the Supreme Court has held that approach to be
correct.

IV. CURRENT U.S. APPROACHES TO DETERMINING THE CONTENT OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

In order to provide an example of the problem this article seeks
to address, the following discussion will recount the approach U.S.
federal courts of appeals have taken to a particular international
legal problem: dealing with the concept of jus cogens. The discussion
will first explain that concept and spell out some of the difficulties it
presents, and then describe the treatment that courts have given it.
A. The Concept of Jus Cogens
There is authority for the proposition that there is a class of
rules of international law from which states are not permitted to

50.
51.
52.

Brief for the United States at 19, Paquette Habana,175 U.S. 677.
PaquetteHabana, 175 U.S. at 700-01.
See supra text accompanying notes 6-23.

53.

Id.
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derogate. 54 The term jus cogens is applied to this class of rules. The
idea that such a class exists raises a number of problems. One way to
evaluate the current approach taken by U.S. courts to CIL is to
examine the approach taken by the courts in addressing these
problems. This section of the article provides some background on the
subject; the sections following describe and critique the decisions of
the federal appellate courts dealing with jus cogens.
One difficulty is basic: what reason is there for a U.S. court to
accept the existence of such a category of rules? To be sure, the
concept is expressly embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law
56
of Treaties, 55 but the United States is not a party to that treaty.
57
Further, only 91 other states are parties. By comparison, 189 states
are members of the United Nations. 5 8 That is, fewer than half the
states in the world have bound themselves to the Vienna Convention,
and thus to a treaty obligation to accept the jus cogens concept. If
U.S. courts are to treat the concept as a part of international law,
then they must justify their action by relying on some source of law
other than either a treaty obligation of the United States or near
universal acceptance by states through a multilateral treaty.
One might hope to gain some insight into the legal basis for jus
cogens by examining the history of the idea; unfortunately, that
inquiry only complicates the question. The proposition that such a
class of norms exists began to receive systematic attention from
scholars of international law following World War I.59 Initially, the
proposition was discussed in connection with the law of treaties;
proponents of the concept argued that treaties purporting to achieve
certain forbidden objectives were void and unenforceable by
international tribunals, analogizing to the rule that, in domestic legal
systems, contracts seeking to attain objectives contrary to public
policy are similarly unenforceable. 60 Those taking this position
appeared to identify forbidden objectives by referring to moral
principles, rather than by focusing on positive acts of states. 61 In
1953, the concept was relied upon when the International Law
Commission of the United Nations (ILC) began to consider the

54.
See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, pt. V
§ 2, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344; 8 I.L.M. 679, 698-99 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
55.
Id.
56.
Treaties and Other International Agreements: the Role of the Senate, S.
Comm. Print No. 106-71, at 43 (2001) [hereinafter Role of the Senate].
57.
Id.
58.

THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK: THE POLITICS, CULTURES AND ECONOMIES OF

THE WORLD 2002 6 (Barry Turner ed., 2001).
59.
A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, As
Illustratedby the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-14. (1995).
60.

Id. at 11.

61.

Id.
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codification of the law of treaties. 62 The first special rapporteurof the
ILC on this subject, then-Professor Hersch Lauterpacht, prepared a
draft Convention on the Law of Treaties which included an article
embodying the concept of jus cogens. 63 He and his successor
rapporteurscontinued the approach of relying on moral principles as
64
at least a partial basis for claiming jus cogens principles existed.
By the time of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties in
1968 and 1969, however, this concept had been modified. 65 The ILC,
in the comments to its draft convention, took the position that a rule
of jus cogens could be modified by a general multilateral treaty-that
is, that governments had the authority to change the rules. 66 This
view was reinforced at the Conference itself. The ILC's draft article
on jus cogens provided: "A treaty is void if it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character." 67 As finally adopted by the representatives of the
governments involved, however, the article on jus cogens read as
follows:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
68
international law having the same character.

As modified, the article clearly sees the test of a rule's jus cogens
status as its acceptance as such by states, not its derivation from
moral rules. In other words, a concept that originated in the belief
that moral principles impose legal limits on state authority-in effect,
applying a natural law approach-was codified in a form that
grounded limitations on states' freedom solely on acceptance of those
limits by states, that is, in a form shaped to satisfy positivist
conceptions of the nature of law.
Since 1969, this doctrinal confusion has not abated. A number of
writers since that time have continued to argue that jus cogens

62.
Id. at 12-13.
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 10-14.
65.
Id. at 14-15.
66.
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966), reprinted
in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169, 248 (1966), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1.
67.
Id. at 247.
68.
See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 54, at 344.
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should be understood as a natural law doctrine. 69 This group even
includes scholars who normally do not rely on natural law concepts in
their expositions of international law. 70 Professor Reisman has

observed that the jus cogens concept has come to be used, in the
human rights context, in a way quite different from its use in the
Vienna Convention. 7 1 As he has observed:
In the [Vienna] Convention, a jus cogens deprives of putative legal
effect other, inconsistent treaty obligations. In human rights discourse,
jus cogens has acquired a much more radical meaning, evolving into a
type of super-custom, based on trans-empirical sources and hence not
72
requiring demonstration of practice as proof of its validity.

In short, the phrase jus cogens is currently applied to two radically
different concepts, the legal bases and implications of which
fundamentally diverge.
State practice since 1969 has not made the matter any clearer.
The only examples of state practice apparently embodying the jus
cogens concept are rhetorical. Delegates to international
organizations and conferences occasionally label particular norms as
jus cogens, and the General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring
the 1978 Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt to "have no
effect in so far as they purport to determine the future of the
Palestinian people and the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel
since 1967,''73 apparently applying the concept of jus cogens if not the
term itself. The General Assembly also adopted numerous resolutions
labeling "void" various unilateral acts of states that arguably violated
the principle of self-determination of peoples, particularly acts by
South Africa with respect to its treatment of Namibia and the
institution of apartheid. 74 But these declarations had little effect on
the actual behavior of states with respect to the issues in question.
For example, despite condemnation of its occupation of Namibia by
U.N. organs, South Africa gave up its control of Namibia only when it
received a quid pro quo in the form of Cuba's agreement to withdraw
its troops from Angola. 75 That is, South Africa's occupation was ended
69.

See, e.g., INGRID DETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 174-76 (1994);

Mark W. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 360-63 (1988);
Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights,
12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 419-22 (1989).
70.
Compare MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL

LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 68-71 (1980) with id. at 339-42.
71.
W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the
World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11
EuR. J. INT'L L. 3, 15 (2000).
72.
Id. at 15 n.29.
73.
G.A. Res. 34/65 B, 4, A/RES/34/65 (Nov. 29, 1979).
74.
LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 302-03 (1988).
75.
CHESTER A. CROCKER, HIGH NOON IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 392-446 (1992).
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by an arrangement in which its interests were taken into account
rather than treated as illegitimate, even in connection with a
situation in which it had, if the implications of the General
Assembly's resolutions are taken seriously, derogated from a norm
from which no derogation was permitted. Indeed, in 1988,
Hannikainen concluded, after an exhaustive survey of state practice,
that:
[W]ith the exception of punitive action against pirates and with the
possible exception of enforcement action against the gravest forms of
racial discrimination, the international community of States as a whole
has not engaged with any consistency in enforcement or punitive action
against grave violations of the basic norms of the international legal
order.76

Nothing has happened since 1988 to alter the conclusion
Hannikainen reached in that year.
While U.S. courts might hope for some guidance in dealing with
jus cogens from the political branches of the federal government, the
executive branch and the Congress have taken different views. The
Vienna Convention, including, of course, its provision regarding jus
cogens, was submitted to the Senate for consent to ratification in
1971. 77 The Senate last held hearings on the Convention in 1986, and
it remains in committee. 7 8 While the executive branch has
consistently favored the United States' becoming a party to the
Vienna Convention, 79 concerns in the Senate have blocked further
action. The primary disagreement involves the effect of the Vienna
Convention on executive agreements into which the President enters
without Senate action.80 However, concerns about jus cogens are also
important. Specifically, the Senate appears to be concerned "by whom
and how" jus cogens norms would be established8 l and about the
Vienna Convention's requirement of compulsory adjudication by the
ICJ of unresolved disputes over jus cogens.8 2 Thus, concerns about
the scope of the obligation that would be assumed with respect to jus
cogens are one of the reasons why the United States has never
become a party to the Vienna Convention.
This last point illustrates a further problem with the concept of
jus cogens: what are the peremptory norms from which no derogation
is permitted? In the commentary to its draft Convention on the Law
of Treaties respecting the article setting out the jus cogens concept,

76.

HANNIKAINEN, supra note 74, at 302.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Role of the Senate, supra note 56, at 45.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 45-49.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
Id.
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the ILC gave only one example of a rule of that class: the provision of
the U.N. Charter prohibiting the use of force between states.8 3 At the
subsequent conference on the law of treaties, however, the various
states' representatives offered widely differing lists of rules meeting
the requirements of jus cogens; of the twenty-six delegations that
offered examples of peremptory norms, no more than thirteen agreed
with respect to any one rule. 84 Moreover, the mutability of the lists of
such norms is surprising. For example, six delegations at the Vienna
Conference took the position that respect for the right of selfdetermination of peoples was a jus cogens norm,8 5 as did some
members of the ILC. 86 Yet by 1992, an arbitration commission
established by the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia
could assert that "international law as it currently stands does not
spell out all the implications of the right to self-determination," 87 and
went on to subordinate that right to the principle that "whatever the
circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve
changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti
possidetis juris) except where the States concerned agree
otherwise. '8 8 Again, as noted above, the prohibitions on the use of
force provided in the U.N. Charter was the one rule which even the
ILC was prepared to label as jus cogens. 89 Yet, as Professor Glennon
has demonstrated, it seems impossible now to classify the full scope of
that prohibition even as a matter of CIL, let alone as a peremptory
norm. 90 And a number of scholars seem prepared to entertain the
possibility that international law permits violation of the relevant
Charter prohibitions if necessary to prevent massive human rights
violations. 91 In short, the status of the concept of jus cogens as an
element of international law is quite confused. In the next section of
the article, we will see what U.S. federal appellate courts have made
of this confusion.

83.
Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
AICN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 (1966) reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169, 247-48
(1966) [hereinafter ILC Reports].
84.
JERZY SZTUCKI, JUS COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 119-20 (1974).
85.
Id. at 119.
86.
ILC Reports, supra note 83, at 248.
87.
See Opinion no. 2, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Jan.
11, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1497, 1498 (1992).
88.
Id.
89.
ILC Reports, supra note 83, at 247-48.
90.
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER:
INTERVENTIONISM AFTER Kosovo 37-89 (2001).
91.
See, e.g., sources cited in A. Mark Weisburd, InternationalLaw and the
Problem of Evil, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 233-37 (2001).
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B. The Courts of Appeals and Jus Cogens
Since the Vienna Convention was signed in 1969, the concept of
jus cogens has figured in nineteen decisions of the federal courts of
appeals. 92 This section describes the approaches to that concept taken
in those cases. The following section critiques those decisions.
The first of these cases to deal with jus cogens was Committee of
United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, in which the
plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the
United States from funding the Nicaraguan contras.93 They based
their claim, among other grounds, on the argument that jus cogens
obliged states which have submitted to an international court's
jurisdiction to abide by that court's judgment, and that the failure of
the United States to abide by the judgment of the ICJ in Nicaraguav.
94
United States therefore entitled them to relief.
In rejecting that argument, the court held that the norm upon
which plaintiffs relied did not satisfy any definition of jus cogenseither that in the Vienna Convention or any other. 95 Relying on the
96
and on one scholarly article, 97
language of the Vienna Convention
the court asserted that a norm achieved jus cogens status only when a
rule of CIL was recognized as jus cogens by the international
community as a whole. 98 The court then held that the rule for which
plaintiffs contended did not satisfy this definition, citing state
practice as collected by various writers for its conclusion.99 In dictum,

92.
See generally Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 357 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003); Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2002);
Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001); Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266
F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2001); Sampson v. F.R.G., 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001); CornejoBarreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000); Cabiri v. Gov't of Repub. of Ghana,
165 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 1999); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996);
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996); Smith v. Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. MattaBallesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995); Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467
(9th Cir. 1994); Gisbert v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Siderman de Blake v.
Repub. of Arg., 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992); Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v.
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
93.
Citizens in Nicaragua,859 F.2d at 932.
94.
Id. at 929, 939-40.
95.
Id. at 953.
96.
Id. at 940 (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 53).
97.
Giorgio Gaja, Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention, 172 HAGUE ACAD.
RECUEIL DES COURS 271, 283-87 (1982).
98.
Citizens in Nicaragua,859 F.2d at 940.
99.
Id. at 941.
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the court went on to list rules that "arguably" satisfied the test for jus
cogens, mentioning the U.N. Charter's prohibition on the use of force,
and prohibitions on genocide, slavery, murder, torture, prolonged
arbitrary detention, and racial discrimination, relying on the
Restatement (specifically Comment k to Section 102, Section 702, and
Comment n to that section) 00 and on law review articles by Professor
Randall'' and Assistant Legal Advisor Whiteman.10 2 The court also
quoted the Restatement to the effect that the scope of jus cogens is so
uncertain that a domestic court should not refuse to enforce an
03
agreement on the ground that it violates jus cogens.1
The next case dealing with jus cogens was Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina in which the plaintiffs made claims for, among
other things, acts of torture carried out by Argentina. 0 4 Argentina
raised the defense of sovereign immunity, and the plaintiffs offered
several arguments against the availability of that defense.10 5 One of
these arguments was that state torture was a violation of a jus cogens
rule and that the defense of sovereign immunity was not available in
suits alleging jus cogens violations. 10 6 The court ultimately rejected
0 7
this argument, but not before discussingjus cogens at length.'
The court defined jus cogens in reference to the definition in the
Vienna Convention. 0 8 It distinguished jus cogens norms from CIL,
however, asserting that, "[w]hereas customary international law
derives solely from the consent of states, the fundamental and
universal norms constituting jus cogens transcend such consent;"'10 9
in reaching this conclusion, the court relied on two student law
review comments, 110 a student law review note, 111 and a quotation
from the ICJ decision in Barcelona Traction, Power & Light Co.

100.
Id.
101.
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66
TEX. L. Rev. 785 (1988).
102.
Marjorie M. Whiteman, Jus Cogens in InternationalLaw, with a Projected
List, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 609 (1977).
103.
Citizens in Nicaragua,859 F. 2d at 941 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 5,
§ 331 cmt. e).
104.
Siderman de Blake v. Repub. of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993).
105.
Id. at 704.
106.
Id. at 713-14.
107.
Id. at 718-19. The court ultimately held that Argentina had waived its
immunity defense. See id. at 720-22.
108.
Siderman de Blake v. Repub. of Arg., 965 F. 2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992).
109.
Id. at 715.
110.
Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A
Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International
Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 365 (1989); David F. Klein, Comment, A Theory for the
Application of the Customary InternationalLaw of Human Rights by Domestic Courts,
13 YALE J. INT'L L. 362 (1988).
111.
Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
833 (1990) [hereinafter Legacy].
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(Belgium v. Spain).112 The court also quoted Comment k to Section
102 of the Restatement to the effect that jus cogens norms "prevail
over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of
international law in conflict with them."113 The court went on to hold
that torture violates CIL, relying on Filartigav. Pefia-Irala,114 Forti
v. Suarez-Mason,115 two opinions from Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic,116 Section 702(d) of the Restatement, on the existence of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, (Torture Convention) 117 and on the fact of
the U.S. Senate's having consented to the ratification of that
treaty. 118 Finally, relying on Filartiga'scharacterization of the degree
of international condemnation of torture, as well as on the article by
Professor Randall which is cited in Citizens in Nicaragua,119 on two of
the student comments on which it had previously relied, 120 and on an
article by Karen Parker and Lyn Beth Neylon, 12 1 the Siderman court
12 2
concluded that the prohibition of torture was a jus cogens norm.
The first three appellate decisions dealing with jus cogens after
Siderman did not analyze that concept, simply citing to one or both of
Citizens in Nicaraguaand Siderman.123 Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany went slightly further, defining jus cogens and specifying its
content by reference to Comment k to Section 102 of the Restatement,
Section 702 of the Restatement and Comment n thereto, and the law
review note cited in Siderman, also relying on Citizens in Nicaragua
and Siderman.124 Princz was followed by five more decisions that did

112.

Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.

5).
113.
Siderman, 965 F.2d at 716.
114.
Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
115.
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
116.
See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub., 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); id. at 820 (Bork, J.,
concurring).
117.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 39 U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess. Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1884/72, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
118.
Siderman, 965 F.2d at 716-17.
119.
Randall, supra note 101.
120.
Belsky et al., supra note 110; Klein, supra note 110.
121.
Parker & Neylon, supra note 69.
122.
Siderman, 965 F.2d at 717.
123.
In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir.
1992) (citing Siderman and Citizens in Nicaraguafor the concept of jus cogens and
Siderman for the proposition that prohibition of torture is a jus cogens norm); Gisbert
v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 n.22 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Citizens in
Nicaragua for the definition of jus cogens); Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos,
Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 n.6, 1475 (1994) (citing Siderman for the
definition of jus cogens and for the proposition that the prohibition on torture is a jus
cogens norm).
124.
Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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no more than either cite earlier cases for their treatment of jus cogens
or else cite, without qualification, authorities cited in those earlier
cases. 12 5 The next case that varied its analysis even slightly was
Cornejo-Barretto v. Seifert, 126 relying on Section 702 of the
Restatement, In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation,127 and
on an article by Professors Dugard and Van den Wyngaert, 128 to
support its characterization of the right to be free from torture as a
129
jus cogens norm.
Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany13 0 differed from all of
the foregoing cases in that it did not accept the concept of jus cogens
uncritically. 131 The case was a suit by a Holocaust survivor against
the German government, seeking damages for his enslavement in
Germany during the Nazi period. 132 Germany relied on the defense of
sovereign immunity. 133 The plaintiff sought to defeat that defense by
arguing that Germany's commission of acts violating jus cogens
134
norms amounted to an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity.
While the court in that case relied on Siderman and Citizens in
Nicaragua for its definition of jus cogens,135 it also quoted
Oppenheim's treatise 136 and Professor D'Amato 13 7 to establish the

125.
United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citing Citizens in Nicaragua and Siderman for the definition and content of jus
cogens); Smith v. Socialist Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir.
1996) (citing Belsky et al., supra note 110); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778
(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Siderman); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir.
1996) (citing Siderman for content of jus cogens); Cabiri v. Gov't of the Repub. of
Ghana, 165 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir. 1999) (using term jus cogens without discussing or
defining it).
126.
Cornejo-Barretto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000).
127.
In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
128.
John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with
Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187, 198 (1998) ("If any human rights norm enjoys
the status ofjus cogens, it is the prohibition on torture.").
129.
Cornejo-Barretto, 218 F.3d at 1016. The court also relied on Filartiga v.
Peia-Irala,630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the right to be free from
torture is a fundamental right); In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d
493, 500 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., Marcos-Manotoc v. Trajano, 508 U.S.
972 (1993) (holding that prohibition against torture is a jus cogens norm). See also
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that official torture violates
CIL).
130.
Sampson v. F.R.G., 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001).
131.
Id. at 1150.
132.
Id.
133.
Id. at 1148.
134.
Id. at 1146-49.
135.
Id. at 1149-50.
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
136.
9th ed. 1992).
137.
Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary InternationalLaw:
A Plea for a Change of Paradigms,25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47 (1995-96).
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vast disagreement among scholars as to the content of jus cogens.138
The court went on to observe:
Domestic courts (and for that matter the other two branches of our
government), do not determine the content of the jus cogens doctrine.
Instead, it emanates from academic commentary and multilateral
treaties, even when unsigned by the United States. Only as a last
resort should United States courts infer jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns through this loosely woven subject matter. See also Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 233 U.S. App. D.C. 384, 726 F.2d 774, 827
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J., concurring) ("Courts ought not to serve as
debating clubs for professors willing to argue over what is or what is
not an accepted violation of the law of nations"). Absent congressional
direction, such overactive involvement by our judiciary would challenge
139
the consent-based structure of our constitutional system.

The court went on to reject plaintiffs implied waiver argument and
held his claims against Germany were barred by sovereign
40
immunity.'
Six federal appellate courts have dealt with the concept of jus
cogens since Sampson. 14 1 Four of these decisions relied on earlier
decided cases or authorities cited therein in its treatment of that
subject, 142 but the other two resembled Sampson in considering
factors not addressed in the earlier cases. 143 Buell v. Mitchell' 44 was
an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
brought by a person convicted by a state court of aggravated murder
and sentenced to death. 145 Among many other grounds, the petitioner
argued that a prohibition on the death penalty was not simply CIL,
but a matter of jus cogens. 14 6 The court relied on the Vienna
Convention, In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, and
Citizens in Nicaragua for the definition of jus cogens.147 However, it

Sampson, 250 F.3d at 1155.
138.
Id. at 1155.
139.
Id. at 1150-56.
140.
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003); Alvarez-Machain v.
141.
United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2004); Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 357
(D.C. 2003); Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2002); Alvarez-Machain v. United
States, 266 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2001); Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001).
Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1050 (defining jus cogens by citing
142.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 102 cmt. k); Yousef, 327 F.3d at 93-94 (citing MattaBallasteros, Citizens in Nicaragua,and the Vienna Convention). Yousef also cites one
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
authority not previously discussed, IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 627 (5th ed. 1998), but only for the uncontroversial proposition
that, under the Vienna Convention, treaties violating a norm ofjus cogens are void. See
also Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 613 (citing Siderman); Hwang Geum Joo, 332 F.3d
at 686 (citing Princz).
See generally Hain, 287 F.3d 1224; Buell, 274 F.3d 337.
143.
Buell, 274 F.3d 337.
144.
Id. at 344.
145.
Id. at 370.
146.
147.

Id.
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stressed language of Section 102 of the Restatement and Comments b
and c to that section, to the effect that for a putative rule to be
considered a norm of CIL, it must amount to "a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation,"' 48 that the practice "should reflect wide acceptance
49
among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity,"'
and that "a practice which is generally followed, but which states feel
legally free to disregard, does not contribute to customary law."' 5 °
The court also relied on Comment k and Reporter's Note 6 to Section
102 for the proposition that jus cogens rules are CIL rules of "higher
status." 15 1 The court further stressed language from Citizens in
Nicaragua underlining that a CIL norm became a jus cogens norm
only upon its acceptance as jus cogens by the international
community as a whole.' 52 The court then examined the problem
before it. 1 3 It noted that a large number of states retain the death
penalty, relying on an article by Professor Schabas presenting
relevant data, 154 and on the fact that a great many states were
parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant), 155 which permits the death penalty.' 56 The court further
observed that there was no indication that states abolishing the death
penalty had done so because they felt they were legally obliged to
take that step, and concluded that, since CIL could not be understood
such a requirement could
as requiring the end of the death penalty,
57
not have risen to the level of jus cogens.'
The last case in this group of sixteen was Hain v. Gibson.'58 Like
Buell, Hain was an appeal from a denial of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus filed by a person sentenced to death.' 59 The petitioner
raised, among other grounds, the argument that because he was
seventeen at the time he committed the murders for which he had
received the death sentence, executing him would violate a jus cogens

Id. at 372 (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 102).
148.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 102 cmt. b).
149.
Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 372-73 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
150.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 102 cmt. k and rptr.'s note 6).
Id.
151.
152.
Id. at 373.
153.
Id.
William A. Schabas, International Law and the Abolition of the Death
154.
Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797, 799 (1998).
Covenant, supra note 20.
155.
Buell, 274 F.3d at 373.
156.
Id. The court went on to hold that, even if it was wrong and the prohibition
157.
of the death penalty was a jus cogens norm, the fact that the petitioner sought to rely
on that norm against a U.S. official rather than as a basis for a civil claim against a
foreign official made the matter a question to be answered by the political departments
of the federal government. Id. at 373-76.
Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2002).
158.
Id. at 1226-27.
159.
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norm. 160 The court cited Buell for the proposition that a jus cogens
norm was one "that has 'risen to the level that the international
community as a whole recognizes it as . . . a norm from which no
derogation is permitted."" 6 1 Without reviewing state practice but
relying on Buell, the court concluded that the rule against the
imposition of the death penalty on a person for crimes committed
prior to the person's eighteenth birthday had not been adopted from a
sense of legal obligation. 162 For this reason, the court held that the
163
rule was not a rule of CIL and therefore not a rule of jus cogens.
These cases, then, illustrate the federal appellate courts' approach to
issues of international law not turning on treaties. In the next
section, we turn to the question of how well this approach withstands
analysis.
C. Critiqueof the Jus Cogens Decisions of the Courts of Appeals
Of the foregoing cases, only five appear to have engaged in any
significant analysis of the concept of jus cogens: Citizens in
Nicaragua, Siderman, Sampson, Buell, and Hain.164 The other cases
simply cite one or more of these five, or authorities cited in those
cases, with no real independent consideration of the question. 165 Each
of these five courts was obliged to address two related issues: first, it
was necessary to decide whether the concept of jus cogens is a part of
international law; assuming an affirmative answer to the first
question, the court then had to address whether the particular
activity involved in the case before it violated a rule with jus cogens
status. 166 What would be a fair evaluation of the treatment of the jus
cogens issue in these decisions?
First, it will be helpful to recall briefly how each court dealt with
these two issues. Citizens in Nicaragua relied on the Vienna
Convention and one writer to define jus cogens and on state practice
as reported in scholarly articles to conclude that the activity at issue

160.
Id. at 1242-43.
161.
Id. at 1243 (citing Buell, 274 F.3d at 373).
162.
Id.
163.
Hain, 287 F.3d at 1243-44. This court also relied on Buell for the
proposition that, even if the rule against executing persons for crimes committed prior
to the eighteenth birthday was jus cogens, the issue of how to respond to that rule was
one properly left to the political branches of the federal government. Id. at 1244.
164.
Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 929 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Siderman de Blake v. Repub. of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 699 (9th Cir. 1992);
Sampson v. F.R.G., 250 F.3d 1145, 1145 (7th Cir. 2001); Buell, 274 F.3d at 337; Hain,
283 F.3d at 1224.
165.
See supra note 92.
166.
Citizens in Nicaragua, 859 F.2d at 929; Siderman, 965 F.2d at 699;
Sampson, 250 F.3d at 1145; Buell, 274 F.3d at 337; Hain, 283 F.3d at 1224.
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was not a violation of a jus cogens norm. The court in that case listed
in dictum certain norms which it suggested would have jus cogens
status, relying on the Restatement and two articles, 16 7 neither of
which purported to base its conclusions on state practice. 168 Though
the court in Citizens in Nicaragua did not acknowledge the confusion
as to the manner by which a particular rule becomes jus cogens, its
reliance on the Vienna Convention and its focus on the actual practice
of states amounts to an acceptance of the idea of jus cogens as a
product of state acceptance, rather than as deriving simply from
moral principles.
Siderman took an approach somewhat different from that of
Citizens in Nicaragua. Siderman purported to rely on the Vienna
Convention to define jus cogens, but its description of that body of
norms as transcending state consent 169 is difficult to reconcile with
the treaty's focus on state acceptance as the hallmark of jus cogens
norms. The Siderman court derived its view of a transcendental jus
cogens from the Restatement, from three student law review pieces,
and by reference to an ICJ opinion. 170 The student pieces on which
the court relied all based their 'jus cogens as moral principles"
approach on scholarly writing, 171 though two of the three relied on
the implications of the Nuremberg trials as well. 172 With respect to
the issue before it, the court concluded that state-sponsored torture
was a violation of CIL in reliance on three decisions by other federal
courts, on the Restatement, and on the existence of and Senate
consent to ratification of the Torture Convention. 173 Its conclusion
that torture was also a violation of a jus cogens norm was based on
one of the federal cases that it believed supported the CIL status of
the prohibition on torture, on Citizens in Nicaragua, on the
Restatement, on Professor Randall's article, on two of the student
pieces on which it had earlier relied, and on an article by Lyn Beth
Neylon and Karen Parker. 174 Among the articles, Professor Randall
supported his claim that torture violates a jus cogens norm by
reference to academic writing; 175 one of the two student pieces offered
no support for the assertion; 176 the other student piece relied on
unnamed international conventions; 177 and Parker and Neylon relied

167.
Citizens in Nicaragua,589 F.2d, at 939-41.
168.
Whiteman, supra note 102, at 609-26; Randall, supra note 101, at 830.
169.
Siderman, 965 F.2d at 715.
170.
Id.
171.
Belsky et al., supra note 110, at 385-86; Klein, supra note 110, at 350-52;
Legacy, supra note 111, at 868.
172.
Klein, supranote 110, at 352; Legacy, supra note 111, at 868.
173.
Siderman, 965 F.2d at 716.
174.
Id. at 716-17.
175.
Randall, supra note 101, at 830.
176.
Belsky et al., supra note 110, at 393-94.
177.
Legacy, supranote 111, at 847 n.lI1.
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on the existence of various conventions and resolutions by the U.N.
General Assembly, on a statement by a U.N. special rapporteur,and
178
on scholarly opinion.
The Sampson court differed from all the others discussed here in
acknowledging the confused character of the concept of jus cogens,
relying on academic commentary for the proposition that academics
disagreed on the issue. 179 The character of slavery as a violation of
1 80
jus cogens was not contested in that case.
The Buell court relied on familiar authorities to define jus
cogens, but put particular weight on its characterization as a higher
degree of CIL.18 ' It relied on state practice, collected in a scholarly
article, as a basis for concluding that the practice under
consideration-imposition of the death penalty-did not violate CIL,
and therefore could not violate jus cogens. i82 It likewise relied on the
absence of evidence that those states which had abolished the death
penalty had done so from a sense of legal obligation.1 8 3 It thus follows
Citizens in Nicaraguarather than Siderman in treating jus cogens as
a product of state acceptance rather than of the application of
transcendental values.
Finally, Hain essentially relied on Buell for its jus cogens
analysis, even concluding, in reliance on Buell, that states that had
abolished the death penalty for crimes committed prior to the
offender's eighteenth birthday had not acted out of a sense of legal
obligation.18 4 This analysis is questionable, since Buell dealt with the
very different issue of whether CIL required the complete abolition of
the death penalty; the analysis may reflect the Hain court's ultimate
conclusion that the international law issues did not really matter in
any event, since the question was one that should be left to the
political branches, whatever the state of international law.
What do these cases tell us about the methods U.S. courts
currently use to determine the content of CIL? First, what is perhaps
most striking about these decisions is their generally uncritical
acceptance of the jus cogens concept itself. As noted above, the idea
that such a doctrine is part of international law seems mired in
confusion and is certainly not supported by the actual practice of
states.18 5 Further, the fact that the Vienna Convention includes the

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Parker & Neylon, supra note 69, at 437-39.
Sampson v. F.R.G., 250 F.3d 1145, 1155 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 372-76 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 373-77.
Id.
Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 2002).
See discussion supranotes 54-91.
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concept is part of the reason the Senate rejected that treaty. 186 Yet
none of the decisions discussed simply rejected the existence of the
concept.' 8 7 Only Sampson hesitated to take it at face value, and the
court's concern was apparently more a matter of the difficulty of
determining which rules had jus cogens status than of the status of
the concept itself.'8 8 In other words, according to the standards set
out in The Paquete Habana for assessing the content of CIL, there is
at least considerable doubt as to whether the jus cogens concept is
anything other than a club with which academics beat each other. Yet
doctrine without even
most of the decisions discussed here accept 8that
9
hinting that its standing is at all doubtful.
To be sure, the decisions are much less questionable in their
outcomes. Citizens in Nicaragua, Buell, and Hain all held that the
international norms alleged to have been violated in those cases were
not of jus cogens status. 190 While Siderman accepted the jus cogens
status of the rule against torture and the status of the prohibition on
slavery was not challenged in Sampson, both cases rejected the
argument that violations of jus cogens operated to eliminate the
protections of sovereign immunity.
Nonetheless, the decisions discussed here treat jus cogens as a
category of international legal norms despite the absence of any
evidence from which they could infer that states' behavior would lead
to the reasonable expectation that this doctrine would be applied by
governments in their relations with one another.' 9 ' Since these
decisions reach their conclusions regarding the existence of jus cogens
without such evidence, they are doubtful as a matter of international
law. Further, and for the same reason, they simply flout the teaching
of The Paquete Habana as to the proper method of determining
192
international law in the absence of a treaty.
How then do we account for this fundamental mistake by a
number of courts? I would suggest that their problems developed
because of the way in which they set out to determine the content of
the law. Rather than looking to state practice to determine the status
of jus cogens as a doctrine of international law, they based their legal
conclusions on sources that cannot generate legal rules, and which, in
this case, misstated the content of state practice.

Id.
186.
Id.
187.
Sampson v. F.R.G., 250 F.3d 1145, 1149-55 (7th Cir. 2001).
188.
See, e.g., Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,
189.
953 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 366-68 (6th Cir. 2001); Hain v.
Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1242-45 (10th Cir. 2002).
190.
Id.
See supra notes 164-84 and accompanying text.
191.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900).
192.
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More specifically, the sources upon which the courts relied
included: (1) scholarly articles cataloging state practice; (2) scholarly
articles, including student pieces, basing assertions as to the content
of law on moral principles derived from the writings of other scholars
and from international treaties and General Assembly resolutions; (3)
the Restatement; (4) decisions by other federal courts; and (5)
decisions by the ICJ. Recall that the focus in The Paquete Habana
was on the practice of states, with the Court relying on scholarly
writings as convenient collections of practice. 193 The reliance of the
courts in Siderman and Buell on similar articles thus is consistent
with the traditional U.S. approach on this subject. But what about
the other types of authority upon which these courts relied?
It will be recalled that the rationale for relying on state practice
as the source for CIL is based upon expectations. 1 94 Consistent
practice can give rise to rules of law, according to this theory, because
states may reasonably expect that other states will in the future
continue to behave as they consistently have in the past. 195 Courts
determining the content of non-treaty international law by relying on
articles that collect state practice, then, can justify their approach,
not merely as sanctioned by the authority of The Paquete Habana,
but as consistent with the basis for treating CIL as law in the first
place. The only function of the writers of the articles is to spare the
judges the necessity of doing the drudge work of collecting state
practice regarding a particular subject. In fact, the courts in Citizens
in Nicaragua and Buell rejected very weak arguments that certain
rules had attained jus cogens status precisely because these
collections of state practice showed just how weak the arguments
196
were.
Each of the other sources on which the courts relied, however,
seems doubtful. This is not because reliance on these sources is not
expressly permitted by The Paquete Habana, but because they are
unreliable guides to state practice. Certainly, in these cases, they did
not alert the courts to the uncertain status of the doctrine of jus
cogens. But the problem with these sources was not that, somehow,
they misunderstood state practice. The problem is much more
fundamental: they simply treated state practice as irrelevant. 197 That
is, they purported to find law in sources which could not give rise to
reasonable expectations as to the course of future behavior by

193.
194.
195.
196.
Cir. 1988);
197.

Id. at 703-10.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Id.
Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 953 (D.C.
Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 366-68 (6th Cir. 2001).
See, e.g., Belsky et al., supra note 110, at 388-89.
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governments.' 98 The following discussions in this section examine
non-practice based scholarly articles, the Restatement, and domestic
and international judicial decisions, explaining why reliance on these
sources amounts to conferring legislative authority on entities that
simply have no claim to it.
1. Articles Basing Legal Rules on Sources Other than State Practice
When a legal writer asserts a proposition to be law, one of the
obvious responses to the assertion is, why do you think so? Such a
response necessarily assumes that the proposition is not law simply
because the writer makes the assertion; it is assumed that a writer
looks to some source authorized to generate legal rules and must
explain how the proposition put forward flows from the authorized
source. The dilemma posed by articles purporting to describe CIL
without relying on state practice is thus obvious. If CIL derives from
state practice, but a writer claims to be able to discern a rule of CIL
without considering state practice, the claim would appear to be a
contradiction in terms.
Examining some of the articles on which the courts relied
demonstrates the weak bases for the conclusions the articles' authors
reached. 199 Consider the articles by Assistant Legal Advisor
Whiteman and Professor Randall, upon which the court in Citizens in
Nicaraguarelied to support the conclusion that acts such as genocide
and torture were violations of jus cogens norms. 20 0 In both articles,
the authors did indeed list norms which might have jus cogens status,
including those mentioned by the court. 20 1 Yet Assistant Legal
Advisor Whiteman apparently relied solely on her own judgment as to
what rules ought to fall within the jus cogens category, citing no
authority to support her conclusions. 20 2 Professor Randall, on the
other hand, cited two articles written by Professor Schwelb, 20 3 but
neither of them even purported to rely on state practice, 20 4 and
neither seemed to support the propositions for which Professor

198.
Id.
199.
Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1016 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
John Dugard and Christine van den Wyngaert, supra note 128, at 198, for the
proposition that the right to be free from torture is a jus cogens norm. This article is
not discussed in the text because the authors simply assert their conclusion without
explaining it).
200.
See supra notes 101-02.
201.
Whiteman, supra note 102, at 625-26; Randall, supra note 101, at 830.
202.
Whiteman, supra note 102, at 625-26.
203.
Randall, supra note 101, at 830.
204.
Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of InternationalJus Cogens as Formulated by
the InternationalLaw Commission, 61 A.J.I.L. 946, 955 (1967) [hereinafter Aspects of
Jus Cogens]; Egon Schwelb, The Actio Popularis and InternationalLaw, 2 ISR. Y.B. ON
HUM. RTS. 46, 56 (1972) [hereinafter Actio Popularis].
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Randall cited them. 20 5 In short, the analyses of both Assistant Legal
Advisor Whiteman and Professor Randall with respect to the points
for which they were cited in Citizens in Nicaragua are rather
doubtful, and neither, in any event, examined state practice to
support her or his conclusions regarding jus cogens.
Siderman provides other examples. That case relied on the
article by Professor Randall, just discussed, and also on an article by
Karen Parker and Lyn Beth Neylon, 20 6 for the proposition that
torture violates a jus cogens rule.20 7 That article addressed the
question as follows:
Torture is widely recognized as contravening jus cogens. All major
human rights agreements and instruments contain a prohibition
against torture. In the relevant treaties, the prohibition is nonderogable. Torture in time of war is a grave breach of humanitarian
law. To reinforce the prohibitions against torture, the United Nations
General Assembly promulgated the Torture Convention. Because of the
universal concern about the widespread occurrence of torture, the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights appointed a special
rapporteur on torture, Peter Kooijmans, to 'promote the full
implementation of the prohibition under international and national law
of the practice of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment.' In Mr. Kooijmans' 1986 report, he
emphasized the jus cogens nature of the prohibition against torture:
Torture is now absolutely and without any reservation prohibited
under international law whether in time of peace or of war. In all
human rights instruments the prohibition of torture belongs to the
group of rights from which no derogation can be made. The

205.
Professor Randall in the text of his article characterizes "norms against
hijacking, hostage-taking, crimes against internationally protected persons, apartheid,
and torture" as likely to be included in any list ofjus cogens norms. Randall, supra note
101, at 830. His only support for this characterization is a footnote in which he claims
that Schwelb, in Actio Popularis, "assert[s] that states have an obligation to outlaw
acts of aggression, genocide, slavery and racial discrimination." Randall, supra note
101, at 830, n.255. In fact, the page Randall cites from Actio Popularis consists solely of
language Schwelb quotes from the ICJ's opinion in Barcelona Traction, in which the
court characterized aggression, genocide, slavery and racial discrimination as outlawed
by international law, and as acts to which any state is permitted to object; the cited
language contains no assertion by Schwelb at all and no assertion that individual
states have the obligation to outlaw the acts which Randall mentions. Schwelb, Actio
Popularis, at 56; Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., 1970
I.C.J. 3. Randall also asserts that Schwelb, in Aspects of Jus Cogens, "recogniz[es] [the]
principles underlying the Genocide Convention as among those that civilized nations
regard as binding." Randall, supra note 101, at 830, n.255; Aspects of Jus Cogens,
supra note 204. In fact, at the page Randall cites, Schwelb is characterizing a holding
of the ICJ, rather than recognizing anything himself. Schwelb, Aspects of Jus Cogens,
supra note 204, at 955. Nowhere in the language Randall cites from Schwelb's articles
is there any reference to hijacking, hostage-taking, crimes against internationally
protected persons, or torture-acts which he asserts are 'likely" violations ofjus cogens
norms in purported reliance on those articles.
206.
Parker & Neylon, supra note 69, at 437-39.
207.
Siderman de Blake v. Repub. of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992).
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International Court of Justice has qualified the obligation to respect
the basic human rights, to which the right not to be tortured belongs
beyond any doubt, as obligations erga omnes . . . which every State
has a legal interest [to implement]. The International Law
Commission ... has labelled serious violations of these basic human
rights as 'international crimes,' giving rise to the specific
responsibility of the States concerned. In view of these qualifications
the prohibition of torture can be considered to belong to the rules of
jus cogens. If ever a phenomenon was outlawed unreservedly and
208
unequivocally it is torture.

The first sentence in the foregoing quotation is supported by a
citation to an article in which then-Professor Higgins asserted that,
with respect to human rights conventions, "[t]here certainly exists a
consensus that certain rights-the rights to life and to freedom from
slavery or torture-are so fundamental that no derogation may be
made." 20 9 However, this assertion is supported only in part, and then
only by reference to the opinions of two other scholars and to a
decision by the ICJ. 210 All of the other assertions made by Parker and
Neylon are supported solely by reference to treaties and non-binding
211
resolutions of various international organizations.
This point raises the issue of the value to be accorded such
sources in determining the content of CIL. First, consider the reliance
on the authority of a noted scholar to support the assertion that a
particular proposition is a legal rule. This would seem justified only
so long as the scholar's opinion flows reasonably from a consideration
of some rule whose legal character is undisputed. If we ignore the
source of the scholar's view and rely on that opinion solely on the
basis of the scholar's reputation, we effectively treat the scholar as a
legislator.
In fact, as Professor Kelly has noted, it is not uncommon for
2 12
international law scholars to view themselves in this fashion.
Professor Sohn has asserted, with respect to the CIL of human rights,
that "states really never make international law on the subject of
human rights. It is made by the people that care; the professors, the
writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of articles in
leading international law journals. ' 213 But it is by no means clear
that because law professors are pleased to see themselves as
legislators anyone else should take the same view. As the court
asserted in United States v. Yousef,

208.
Parker & Neylon, supra note 69, at 437-39 (footnotes omitted).
209.
Rosalyn Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 281, 282 (1977).
210.
Id. at 282.
211.
Parker & Neylon, supra note 69, at 437-39, nn.165-70.
212.
Kelly, supra note 23, at 478, 492.
213.
Louis B. Sohn, Sources of InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 399
(1995-96).
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This notion-that professors of international law enjoy a special
competence to prescribe the nature of customary international law
wholly
unmoored
from
legitimating
territorial
or national
responsibilities, the interests and practices of States, or (in countries
such as ours) the processes of democratic consent-may not be unique,
but it is certainly without merit.
Put simply, and despite protestations to the contrary by some
scholars (or "publicists" or "jurists"), a statement by the most highly
qualified scholars that international law is x cannot trump evidence
that the treaty practice or customary practices of States is otherwise,
much less trump a statute or constitutional provision of the United
States at variance with x. This is only to emphasize the point that
scholars do not make law, and that it would be profoundly inconsistent
with the law-making processes within and between States for courts to
permit scholars to do so by relying upon their statements, standing
alone, as sources of international law. In a system governed by the rule
of law, no private person-or group of men and women such as
comprise the body of international law scholars-creates the law.
Accordingly, instead of relying primarily on the works of scholars for a
statement of customary international law, we look primarily to the
formal lawmaking and official actions of States and only secondarily to
the works of scholars as evidence of the established practice of
States.214

The views of then-Professor Higgins upon which Parker and Neylon
relied seem to have been only weakly supported.2 15 It appears that
they are assuming that her assertion is true, simply because she said
it.21 6
It is also necessary to consider the reliance by Parker and Neylon
on the language of various treaties and non-binding declarations to
support their conclusion regarding the jus cogens status of torture. As
noted above, it would appear that treaties and non-binding
declarations are useful evidence of state intentions, absent better
evidence. 217 If a government binds itself legally to behave in a
particular way, it is hardly unreasonable to assume that the
government's future behavior will conform to its legal obligation, all
other things being equal. Likewise, if a government simply announces
that it will adhere to a certain pattern of behavior, without assuming
any legal obligation to do so, the most likely assumption is that the
government will behave as it has said it would behave, all other
things being equal.
But now suppose that all other things are not equal. Suppose
that it quickly becomes apparent that the government is not
conforming its behavior to its treaty commitment or to its nonbinding announcement, as the case may be. Since the crucial issue is

214.
215.
216.
217.

United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2003) (footnotes omitted).
Higgins, supra note 209, at 281-82.
Parker & Neylon, supra note 69, at 437.
See supra text accompanying note 19.
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how the government will actually behave, its behavior is the best
evidence on that issue. If the behavior contradicts the government's
undertakings, it seems unreasonable to insist that the undertakings
are the only relevant basis upon which to form expectations and to
argue further that the behavior can be disregarded.
This last situation seems to be the case for the instruments on
which Parker and Neylon rely. 218 For example, one of the treaties on
which they base their assertion is the Covenant. 2 19 But a very large
minority of parties to that treaty violate its provisions relating to
torture.220 More generally, Professor Hathaway's careful research
suggests:
[T]hat not only is treaty ratification not associated with better human
rights practices than otherwise expected, but it is often associated with
worse practices. Countries that ratify human rights treaties often
appear less likely, rather than more likely, to conform to the
requirements of the treaties than countries that do not ratify these
22 1
treaties.

Treating a state's ratification of human rights treaties as evidence
that the state protects human rights is simply not justified by the
evidence. Therefore, whatever positive expectations regarding
protection of human rights might be generated by the fact that many
states have ratified human rights treaties, if that fact is considered in
isolation, an account of the actual behavior of states in this area
makes it unreasonable to maintain such expectations.
However doubtful a given treaty may be as a source of CIL, it
does at least create legal obligations in its own right. This may offer
some excuse for the reliance of Parker and Neylon on widely-ignored
human rights treaties as sources of jus cogens.22 2 But neither the
ILC, nor the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, nor any special
rapporteursof that Commission, have any capacity whatever to create
law. Why then do Parker and Neylon rely on such sources to support
their arguments? Either those entities correctly state the content of
international law or they do not. In neither case are the entities'
conclusions themselves particularly helpful. This is perhaps obvious
in the case where they misstate the content of the law. But even if
their views of the law are correct, presumably what ought to count
are the sources from which they were able to form their opinionsand if those sources are what is crucial, why not cite them directly?

218.
Parker & Neylon, supra note 69, at 437-56.
219.
Id. at 437 n.165.
220.
A.M. Weisburd, Implications of International Relations Theory for the
InternationalLaw ofHuman Rights, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45, 55-60 (1999).
221.
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L.J. 1935, 1989 (2002).
222.
See generallyParket & Neylon, supra note 69.
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One is forced to conclude that Parker and Neylon simply do not
care about state practice, about behavior that gives rise to reasonable
expectations regarding future behavior. They cite treaties whose
language contains the rule which they wish to label as legally
binding, ignoring completely the question of compliance with those
treaties. 223 They cite statements from entities without law-creating
authority which agree with their views, but do not indicate any basis
2 24
for concluding that those entities' views of the law are correct.
They are simply citing authorities that lend whatever color they have
to the conclusion they wish to reach. Their result is therefore suspect.
The court in Siderman also relied for its conclusion on three
comments by law students. One may question whether law students
fall within The Paquete Habana's reference to "jurists and
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of
which they treat,"225 but these articles have their flaws in any event.
One was cited for the proposition that jus cogens rules bind states
regardless of their consent, and also for the proposition that "there is
widespread agreement among scholars that the prohibition against
official torture has achieved the status of a jus cogens norm. '226 The
student author based his assertion that state consent is irrelevant to
jus cogens on a scholarly article and on a treatise.2 27 The treatise
228
contains language, not supported by references to state practice,
22 9
that may support the student author's point if taken in isolation,
but which comes from a discussion that treats the issue ofjus cogens
quite cautiously. This discussion also notes that the firmest support
for the concept of jus cogens is provided by the Vienna Convention,
which grounds that concept in state consent. 230 The article cited by
the student author does not purport to base its conclusions on state
practice, but instead offers a theoretical justification for the doubtful
23 1
assertion that human rights treaties are inherently self-executing.
To be sure, the student author asserts that "nations do observe jus

223.
See Parker & Neylon, supra note 69, at 437 n.165 (citing treaties).
224.
Id. at 428-29 nn. 94, 102 (citing statements made by the International Law
Commission).
225.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
226.
See Siderman de Blake v. Repub. of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715-17 (9th Cir.
1992) (citing Klein, supra note 110, for both propositions).
227.
Klein, supra note 110, at 351 n.98.
228.

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 514 (3d ed.

1979).
229.
See id. ("[T]he specific content of norms of [jus cogens] involves the
irrelevance of protest, recognition, and acquiescence: prescription cannot purge this
type of illegality.").
230.
See id. at 512-15; see also supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
231.
Alan Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants on
Human Rights: A TheoreticalFramework, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 219, 231 (1985).
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cogens, seek to enforce it upon each other, and deny their own
violations of it,"232 showing that the author understood the
importance of grounding his argument in state practice. However, he
supports his assertions regarding state behavior only by mentioning
the fact that states have entered into numerous treaties purporting to
protect human rights, without addressing the poor human rights
performance even of parties to those treaties. 233 He offers no
examples, for instance, of an effort to enforce jus cogens, presumably
because he could find none. 2 34 His assertion that the prohibition
against torture is a jus cogens norm is entirely unsupported. 235 By
citing him for this proposition, the court in Siderman was essentially
treating his assertion as true simply because he made it.
A second student piece 236 is also cited in Siderman for the
proposition that the obligations created by jus cogens norms
transcend state consent. 237 That note, however, bases its argument
that such a transcendental concept of jus cogens has entered
international law solely upon references to the Vienna Convention
and the Restatement.238 As noted above, the Vienna Convention in
fact rejects this approach to jus cogens.239 In any event, the student
writer does not support his argument by references to state
240
practice.
The court in Siderman also relied on yet another student piece to
support its conclusion that the concept of jus cogens is part of
international law. 24 1 In their discussion of the basis for the concept,
the student authors observed that, during the sixteenth century,
natural law was an important basis for international law.242 They
then asserted that jus cogens "has revived the natural law idea of a
'243
law binding irrespective of the will of the sovereign states.
Nowhere in their articles have the students betrayed any awareness
of the tremendous difficulties presented by the concept of natural law,

232.
Klein, supra note 110, at 351.
233.
See Hathaway, supra note 221, at 1989 ("[N]ot only is treaty ratification not
associated with better human rights practices . . . it is often associated with worse
practices.").
234.
See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 74, at 302 ("[Tlhe international community of
states as a whole has not engaged with any consistency in enforcement ... of the basic
norms of the international legal order.").
235.
Klein, supra note 110, at 354 n.l11. Although the author states, "freedom
from torture seems firmly entrenched in international agreements," he does not
specifically identify any such agreements.
236.
Legacy, supra note 111.
237.
Siderman de Blake v. Repub. of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992).
238.
Legacy, supra note 111, at 868 n.261.
239.
See supratext accompanying notes 54-58.
240.
See Legacy, supra note 111.
241.
Siderman, 965 F.2d at 715 (citing Belsky et al., supranote 110).
242.
Belsky et al., supranote 110.
243.
Id. at 386.
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much less sought to justify their reliance on that concept.2 4 4 Surely
an article that deals so superficially with an idea fundamental to its
thesis is a weak basis for the opinion of a court.
The Siderman court relied on this last student article, among
others, for the proposition that torture is a violation of a jus cogens
norm. 245 The article addresses that issue by asserting, "The most
fundamental individual rights are embodied in the concept of jus
cogens. For example, a state policy of genocide, torture, or slavery,
some of the worst violations of individual rights, is generally accepted
as violating jus cogens norms." 246 The only support given for this
assertion is a footnote, inserted after the first of the two sentences
just quoted, which reads as follows:
The suggestion has been made that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/180 at 71 (1948), reprinted
in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, . . . at § 440.1, has

'the attributes ofjus cogens.' M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 274 (1980).247

In essence, what this article offers is ipse dixit from a group of
law students.2 48 To be sure, they cite to a famous treatise on
international law, but that work is characterized only as making a
suggestion. 249 The language to which reference is made in the cited
work is itself supported only by an internal citation to another part of
the same work;2 50 that other part argues that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights has become CIL, but does not support
the jus cogens characterization to which reference is made in the
quoted footnote. 25 1 All in all, these students' writing seems a weak
basis for a court's assertion that a particular rule amounts to nonderogable international law.
The foregoing discussion shows that at least some courts have
decided questions of international law by relying on articles that are
doubtful in their reasoning and weakly supported by authority. This

244.
For a discussion of the philosophical weaknesses of arguments contending
that all human beings possess equal rights simply by virtue of their status as human
beings, see JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 88-94 (1973).
245.
Siderman, 965 F.2d at 716.
246.
Belsky et al., supra note 110, at 393-94.
247.
Id. at 393 n.152 (omitting only a cross-reference).
248.
Ipse dixit is latin for "he himself said it." The term is defined as "something
asserted but not proved." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 833 (7th ed. 1999).
249.
See supra text accompanying note 247 ("The suggestion has been made..
(emphasis added).
250.

MYRES S. McDOuGAL ET AL., supra note 70, at 274 n.366 (1980).

251.
Id. at 320-32. It should be noted that the argument regarding the CIL
status of the Universal Declaration is based solely on statements by scholars,
resolutions of the General Assembly, and assertions that that Declaration has been
frequently "invoked"--not on assertions, let alone on evidence, that it has been put into
practice.
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is not to say that courts should ignore articles in dealing with CIL,
but only that the mere fact that an assertion about international law
appears between the covers of a respected legal periodical does not
necessarily mean that the assertion should be given any weight.
Indeed, given the tendency of some scholars of international law to
see themselves as legislators, it would seem that a particularly high
degree of caution is appropriate in relying on academic writing in this
field.
2. The Restatement
Several of the cases discussed herein relied heavily on the
Restatement in their discussions of jus cogens. 252 While this might be
seen as another instance of reliance upon academic authority, that is
a bit of an over-simplification. Indeed, given the eminence of the
American Law Institute, taking its views seriously is understandable.
Unfortunately, however, a number of the assertions the Restatement
makes regarding the content of international law seem weakly
supported and, indeed, not to "restate" anything.
For example, several courts relied on Comment k to Section 102
in their discussions ofjus cogens. That comment reads:
Peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens). Some rules of
international law are recognized by the international community of
states as peremptory, permitting no derogation. These rules prevail
over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of
international law in conflict with them. Such a peremptory norm is
subject to modification only by a subsequent norm of international law
having the same character. It is generally accepted that the principles
of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force (Comment h)
have the character of jus cogens. See §331(2) and Comment e to that
253
section.

The emphasized language in this quotation goes beyond the Vienna
Convention in its approach to jus cogens, since the comment asserts
that jus cogens can invalidate "other rules of international law,"
presumably referring to rules of CIL, while the Convention deals only
with international agreements. 254 The Restatement's formulation
appears inconsistent with the Convention's derivation of jus cogens
from state acceptance. This follows when one considers the possible
forms of a conflict between a jus cogens rule and a rule of CIL. If a
CIL rule were derived from state practice, but state practice
subsequently changed, such that the new practice was accepted as jus
cogens, there would be no conflict between the rules. Rather, the old

252.
See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Repub. of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 714-18 (9th
Cir. 1992).
253.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, §102 cmt. k (emphasis added).
254.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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CIL rule would simply not be a rule any longer-it would no longer
correspond to state practice. Indeed, this would be true whether or
not a rule embodying the new state practice was labeled jus cogens.
The conflict envisaged in the Restatement comment, therefore, must
refer to a conflict between a jus cogens rule and a rule of CIL.
However, if jus cogens is defined as a rule accepted by the
international community as a whole as one from which no derogation
is permitted (as the Vienna Convention states) then such a conflict
could not arise, since actual acceptance of the jus cogens character of
the rule is logically inconsistent with the assertion that there could
exist a CIL rule-that is a rule derived from a general practice of
states-in conflict with the jus cogens rule. If, however, jus cogens is
seen as deriving from trans-empirical sources, as Professor Reisman
suggests some have argued, 255 such a conflict is much easier to
envision. Obviously, actual practice can differ from some rule based
on something other than actual practice. But it hardly seems
reasonable to characterize a rule based on something other than
actual practice as a rule accepted by the international community as
a whole as one from which no derogation is permitted, which is the
2 56
Vienna Convention's definition of jus cogens.
How then does the Restatement explain its characterizing jus
cogens in a way inconsistent with the Vienna Convention? Its
explanation for Comment k is set out in Reporter's Note 6 to Section
102:
Peremptory norms (jus cogens). The concept of jus cogens is of relatively
recent origin. See Schwelb, "Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens
as Formulated by the International Law Commission," 61 [American
Journal of International Law] 946 (1967). It is now widely accepted,
however, as a principle of customary law (albeit of higher status). It is
incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles
53 and 64. See § 331(2) and Comment e to that section. Comment k to
this section adopts the definition of jus cogens found in Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention. The Vienna Convention requires that the norm
(and its peremptory character) must be "accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole" (Art. 53). Apparently
that means by "a very large majority" of states, even if over dissent by
"a very small number" of states. See Report of the Proceedings of the
Committee of the Whole, May 21, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/11 at 47172. 257

Preliminarily, it should be stressed that, as Professor McCaffrey
noted years ago, the American Law Institute does not approve the
content of the reporter's notes, which reflect the views of the

255.

Reisman, supranote 71, at 15 n.29.

256.
257.

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 102, rptr.'s note 6.
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reporters only. 258 These notes have no more authority than any other
scholarly assertion. In the case of this note, moreover, not only does
this discussion fail to explain why Comment k's definition of jus
cogens departs from that of the Vienna Convention, it even asserts,
inaccurately, that Comment k adopts the definition of the Vienna
Convention. 259 Further, that comment characterizes the concept of
jus cogens as "widely accepted" without identifying the entities that
accept it. 260 In particular, it offers no evidence of acceptance by states
generally or by the United States in particular. In essence, readers of
the Restatement are to accept its assertions on faith.
Reporter's Note 6 cross-references Comment n of Section 702.261
That comment provides that, "[n]ot all human rights norms are
peremptory norms (us cogens), but those in clauses (a) to (f)of this
section are, and an international agreement that violates them is
void. See § 331(2)."262 This comment is supported by Reporter's Note
11, which provides:
Human rights law and jus cogens. Not all human rights norms are jus
cogens, but [the prohibitions on genocide, slavery or slave trade, the
murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, torture or other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged
263
have that
arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination],
quality. It has been suggested that a human rights norm cannot be
deemed jus cogens if it is subject to derogation in time of public
emergency; see, for example, [Article] 4 of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, § 701, Reporters' Note 6. Nonderogability in emergency
and jus cogens are different principles, responding to different
concerns, and they are not necessarily congruent. In any event, the
of this section are not subject to
rights recognized in clauses (a) to (f)
derogation in emergency under the Covenant. Article 4 of the Covenant
explicitly excludes from derogation the right to life and freedom from
slavery and from torture, as well as from racial discrimination.
Freedom from arbitrary detention is not included among the
nonderogable provisions, but since derogation is permitted only "in time
of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation," and only "to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,"
detentions that meet those standards presumably would not be
arbitrary. See, generally, McDougal, Lasswell and Chen, [Human
Rights and World Public Order] 338-50 (1980).264

258.
Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Restatement's Treatment of Sources and
Evidence of InternationalLaw, 25 INT'L LAW. 311, 317 n.27 (1991).
Id. § 102, cmt. k ("Comment k to this section adopts the definition of jus
259.
cogens found in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention").
260.
Id. ("[Jus cogens] is now widely accepted, however as a principle of
customary law (albeit of higher status).").
261.
Id.
Id. § 702, cmt. n.
262.
263.
Id. § 702, rptr.'s note 11 (referring to prohibitions listed in RESTATEMENT,
supra note 5, § 702(a)-(O).
Id.
264.
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The Restatement thus offers no support from state practice for its
assertions. To be sure, it cites to a treatise, but that treatise justifies
its characterization of certain rules as jus cogens norms solely by
reference to statements made by delegates at the conference which
produced the Vienna Convention, to scholarly opinion, and to certain
266
decisions of the ICJ. 265 It too makes no reference to state practice.
In short, the sections of the Restatement upon which the courts
relied in the cases discussed above are not reliable guides to state
practice. To be fair, the Restatement does not claim otherwise:
[T]he universal acceptance of human rights in principle, and active
international concern with human rights, has led to some readiness to
conclude that states have assumed human rights obligations. There is a
disposition to find legal obligation in indeterminate language about
human rights in international agreements, e.g., the United Nations
Charter . . . . There is some willingness to find that the practice of

states, perhaps under constitutional, political, or moral impetus, is
practice with a sense of international legal obligation creating a
customary international law of human rights, even though many states
sometimes violate these rights ....

Absorption into international law of

principles common to national legal systems generally is only a
secondary source of international law ....

but there is a willingness to

conclude that prohibitions common to the constitutions or laws of many
states are general principles that have been absorbed into international
law.

26 7

The Restatement does not pretend to rely on the actual practice of
states regarding human rights in its discussion of the CIL or, we may
assume, the jus cogens norms of human rights. 268 It justifies this
approach by reference to "a disposition to find legal obligation in
indeterminate language about human rights in international
agreements," without identifying the entities so disposed. 269 It also
refers to "some willingness to find that the practice of states, perhaps
under constitutional, political, or moral impetus, is practice with a
sense of international legal obligation creating a customary
international law of human rights," without indicating who is willing
to make this leap. 270 More fundamentally, the Restatement does not
explain why such an approach is justified. It is as though the drafters
of the Restatement have determined that human rights rules ought to
be treated as exceptions to the normal processes of international law

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 70, at 338-50.
See id.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 701, rptr.'s note 1.
See id. (containing no reference to actual state practice).
Id.
Id.
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formation, even though nothing in those normal processes would
271
indicate that such rules have any special status.
To sum up, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law should be
treated with great caution as, indeed, one court has held. 272 It does
not even purport to justify its assertions regarding the subjects
discussed in this article, except by inaccurate citations to the Vienna
Convention and by relying on scholarly opinion. If CIL is supposed to
be created by the practice of states rather than by law professors, it
273
would seem the Restatement is a poor guide to CIL. As noted above,
Judge Robb once asserted that, "[c]ourts ought not to serve as
debating clubs for professors willing to argue over what is, or what is
not, an accepted violation of the law of nations. ''274 Unfortunately, the
Restatement appears to be a collection of the arguments of only one
side in a professorial debate.

271.
Accounting for the approach the Restatement takes on these matters is
difficult. Professor Henkin, Chief Reporter, rejected the argument that scholars'
opinions should be considered a source of international law. 57 A.L.I. PROC. 79 (1980).
Nonetheless, the American Law Institute's debates on these subjects make little
reference to state practice, as distinct from actions by international organizations and
the language of treaties. See id. at 123-26, 128-30; 59 A.L.I. PROC. 204-26 (1982); 62
A.L.I. PROC. 395-400, 539-44 (1985). Some comments made in the course of the debates
support the argument that actual state practice was not really controlling in drafting
the Restatement. See, e.g., 59 A.L.I. PROC. 204-26 (1982). In one of the debates on the
Restatement, Professor Henkin characterized Section 702 as including in its lists of
prohibited behaviors "that which no state admits it practices, brags about practicing, or
asserts the right to practice." Id. That is, the list consisted, not of actions from which
states refrained, but of actions states were unwilling to claim the right to take. But it is
not clear why a state's refusal to admit to a practice would create an expectation that
the state would refrain from the practice. Further, with respect to the content of jus
cogens, Professor McDougal, one of the advisers to the Reporters, defended his
conclusion that certain human rights protections were jus cogens norms by reference to
the views of one hundred writers, not by reference to the practice of states. 57 A.L.I.
PROC. 128 (1980). In debate, Professor Lillich characterized section 702 as "very
revolutionary," as going "very, very far" and as "rather radical." 59 A.L.I. PROC. 219-20
(1982). Such statements suggest some awareness that the positions taken in the
Restatement were not uncontroversial. It should also be noted that a notewriter in the
Yale Journal of InternationalLaw pointed out a few years ago that, with respect to
another element of the Restatement, the reporters appear to have chosen to "restate"
the law according to their notions of good policy, aware of the fact that their views did
not, in fact, reflect the state of the law as of the time of their drafting efforts. David B.
Massey, Note, How the American Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The
Reasonableness Requirement of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J.
INT'L. L. 419, 441-42 (1997). Such a thing would not seem impossible with respect to
the issues addressed in this article, especially given the strong views on the subject of
the Chief Reporter, Professor Henkin. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State
"Sovereignty",25 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 31, 37-39 (1995-96).
272.
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 99-103 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
the district court erred in relying on the Restatement to support its conclusion
regarding the content of CIL).
273.
See quotation supra note 139.
274.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub., 726 F.2d 774, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb,
J., concurring).
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3. Decisions of U.S. Courts
Several of the decisions described above relied on the decisions of
other U.S. courts when addressing the content of CIL. While it might
seem unremarkable for a court to rely on a sister court's decision
when addressing a question of law, this approach is in fact
problematic in the situation addressed in this article. This is so for
two reasons.
First, decisions by U.S. federal courts regarding CIL are
necessarily less authoritative than are their decisions regarding
either the Constitution or federal statutes. Those courts are the only
judicial bodies whose constructions of the Constitution and federal
statutes can be considered binding. When the federal courts construe
the Constitution or an act of Congress, they are addressing legal
instruments adopted by the very sovereignty of which they are
themselves an arm. In essence, when federal courts construe federal
law, the United States government is announcing what its own law
means.
In contrast, whatever the status of CIL vis & vis federal law,275
no one maintains that CIL is created solely by actions of the various
parts of the government of the United States. When federal courts
construe CIL, their task is more akin to that of addressing the law of
a foreign country than to that of interpreting a federal statute, and
their conclusions should be treated with appropriate caution. After
all, if a federal court found itself forced to interpret, for example, a
Canadian statute, it would presumably rely, in the first instance, on
Canadian readings of the statute, whether those of a Canadian court
or of some other entity considered authoritative in Canada. This
would be true, I suggest, even if another federal court had recently
addressed the same statute. Canada's law is determined by Canada,
and a U.S. court's understanding of that law cannot be controlling in
the same way such a court's view of U.S. law can be controlling.
Similarly, with respect to CIL, the focus for U.S. courts should be on
CIL itself, which is to say on the state practice that creates that body
of law. Those courts are, in essence, relying on what amounts to
secondary sources of CIL if, when faced with a CIL issue, they rely on
U.S. judicial interpretations of CIL rather than on the substance of
CIL itself.
The second reason for caution in relying on U.S. court decisions
to determine the content of CIL is that such a determination is
heavily fact-specific.2 76 In addressing questions of U.S. law, a U.S.
court can look to the language of the Constitution, of statutes, or of

275.
276.

See supra note 4.
Id.
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administrative regulations, and can read relevant judicial opinions.
While interpreting these resources may be difficult, there is typically
no difficulty in determining their content. It is seldom a problem to
determine what words the legislature uttered, even if it may be
difficult to determine what those words mean.
With respect to CIL, however, a court must engage in a factual
inquiry to determine the content of the relevant state practice. The
problem is not simply that an earlier decision may have found the
facts of state practice incorrectly, although that is of course a concern.
It is also that the interactions between governments that create CIL
are never-ending. Even if a court's conclusion regarding a particular
CIL issue in 1999 was defensible in light of state practice at that
time, a court addressing the same issue in 2004 cannot simply
assume that state practice in the intervening five years has had no
effect on the law. Nor is it necessarily safe to infer that because state
practice on one subject takes one form it necessarily takes the same
form with respect to a related subject.
The cases discussed above offer an example of the problems that
can arise when one U.S. court relies on another to support a
conclusion regarding the content of CIL. Buell v. Mitchell2 vv found
that the death penalty was not contrary to the general practice of
states, relying in part on the fact that the Covenant permits the
death penalty. 278 Hain v. Gibson279 relied on Buell to support the
conclusion that states that have abolished the death penalty for
persons who committed crimes before their eighteenth birthdays have
not necessarily done so from a sense of legal obligation. 280 But the
issues in the two cases were not the same; Buell dealt with the
complete elimination of the death penalty, Hain with partial
abolition. 281 Further, to the extent that the result in Buell depended
on the Covenant's approach to the death penalty, reliance on Buell's
method of analysis should have led the Hain court to a result opposite
to that which it reached. This follows because the Covenant forbids
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed prior to a
2 82
defendant's eighteenth birthday.
The foregoing is not meant to suggest that a careful discussion of
a point of CIL should be ignored simply because it is found in the
opinion of a U.S. court. It is rather to say that, however helpful a
court decision may be in providing insight into a question of CIL, it

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 371-72 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 371-72.
Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1244 (10th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1243-44.
Buell, 274 F.3d at 373-74; Hain, 287 F.3d at 1242-44.
Covenant, supra note 20, art. 6.
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cannot take the place of an examination of the fundamental sources
2 83
of that body of law.
4. Decisions of International Courts
If a judge seeking to determine the content of a rule of
international law can rely on the decisions of U.S. courts only with
great caution, it would not be surprising for that judge to assume that
more confidence could be reposed in the decisions of international
tribunals. Such tribunals deal only with questions of international
law; their judges are, in many cases, expert in that field. Reliance on
such tribunals, therefore, would seem to be a reasonable way for a
busy judge to deal with a complex and possibly unfamiliar body of
law.
Nonetheless, the decisions of international tribunals must also
be treated with caution by U.S. judges. At least two factors support
this conclusion. First, the legal instruments establishing the court in
question may indicate questions as to the scope of authority conferred
upon it. Second, even if a court's authority seems unambiguous, the
inevitable delay in states' correcting a judicial decision they see as
incorrect means that too quick an embrace of controversial decisions
by an international tribunal may result in a U.S. judge treating as
established a judicial construction of a legal rule which states
ultimately reject.
An example of a tribunal of limited authority is provided by the
best-known of these bodies, the ICJ. 284 Its basic document indicates
that its decisions are not to be treated as having precedential
value. 285 That document, read with the U.N. Charter, also shows that
states even limited the ICJ's capacity to finally resolve individual

283.
It might be objected that, if this argument is correct, then this article's
stress on the method of determining CIL employed in The Paquete Habana makes no
sense; there is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court is any more authoritative
regarding CIL than is any other U.S. court, so arguments criticizing contemporary
methods of determining CIL for departing from the approach of The Paquete Habana
make no sense. While this argument has some plausibility, it depends on the
assumption that The Paquete Habana is either controlling or irrelevant. Surely,
however, the views of the Supreme Court ought to carry some weight with lower
federal courts, even if those views are not controlling. At minimum, the lower courts
ought to acknowledge any departures they make from an approach taken by the
Supreme Court, and explain why they believe the Supreme Court was wrong. The point
in citations to The Paquete Habana is not that the lower courts should have adhered
slavishly to that decision's method of determining the content of CIL, but rather that
those courts' decisions show no awareness that they are departing from the Supreme
Court's approach to this issue, and provide no justification for their actions.
284.
See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ STATUTE].
285.
Id. art. 59.
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disputes. 28 6 The Statute of the ICJ28 7 includes three articles, which
taken together with Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, 288 indicate both
that the decisions of the ICJ were not intended to create law and that
states were quite conservative in the scope of authority they were
willing to grant to the court. A consideration of Articles 38(l)(d) and
59 of the Statute demonstrates the first point. Article 38(1)(d)
provides:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:...
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
289
law.

Article 59 provides that "[tihe decision of the Court has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular
290
case."
The most natural reading of these two articles is that judicial
decisions are solely a subsidiary means determining the content of
international law. Article 38(1)(d) states this position expressly.
Article 59 negates the existence of any legal effect of a judgment of
the ICJ except as between the parties to a case, with respect to that
case; the phrase in Article 38(1)(d) making the application of that
paragraph subject to Article 59 can most easily be seen as meaning
that the designation of judicial decisions as subsidiary means for
determining the content of law is not intended somehow to qualify the
limiting effects on the ICJ's judgments imposed by Article 59.291
The drafting history of these provisions reinforces this
conclusion. 292 Article 36 of the Statute reinforces the conclusion that

286.
Id. art. 62; U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
287.
Id.
288.
U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
289.
ICJ STATUTE, supra note 284, art. 38(d).
290.
Id. art. 59.
291.
Id. arts. 38, 59.
292.
The portions of the ICJ Statute here in question are all are drawn from the
correspondingly numbered articles of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ), which was established in 1921. Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 390. An advisory committee of
jurists prepared the initial draft of that statute. As finally adopted, that committee's
version of the language which became article 38(1)(d) read, 'The Court shall . . .
apply... 4. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."
Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Annex 1,
32d Meeting, PROCkS-VERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE JUNE 16THJULY 24th 1920 WITH ANNEXES 673, 680 (1920). The committee's intention to make
clear that the PCIJ would lack law-making authority is shown by its continual
adjustment of the language that became Article 38(1)(d) in the direction of emphasizing
that meaning. Its first version provided, "the following rules are to be applied by the
judge in the solution of international disputes; . . .4. International jurisprudence as a
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means for the application and development of law." Annex No. 3, 13th Meeting, id. at
281, 306. This language provoked considerable debate, with its proponent, Baron
Descamps, asserting that
[Doctrine] could only be of a subsidiary nature; the judge should only use it in a
supplementary way to clarify the rules of international law. Doctrine and
jurisprudence no doubt do not create law; but they assist in determining rules
which exist. A judge should make use of both jurisprudence and doctrine, but
they should serve only as elucidation.
Annex No. 3, 15th Meeting, id. at 336. A drafting committee altered the proposed
language to read, "The Court ... shall . . .apply . . . 4. Rules of law derived from
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations." Annex 2, 25th Meeting, id. at 561, 567. This was later modified by the
addition of the phrase, "as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law"
after the word "nations." Annex 2, 29th Meeting, id. at 629, 636. Apparently,
controversy continued on the subject, as Baron Descamps subsequently proposed
altered language "as a compromise." 30th Meeting, id. at 617, 620. The final version is
set out in the text.
The matter then moved to the Council of the League of Nations. The language
ultimately adopted by that body for Articles 38(4) (now Article 38(1)(d)) and 59 is
identical to that of those articles in their current form. Compare Statute for the
Permanent Court of International Justice Provided for by Article 13 of the Covenant of
the League of Nations arts. 38(4), 59, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, Permanent Court of
International Justice, Documents Concerning the action taken by the Council of the
League of Nations under Article 14 of the Covenant and the Adoption by the Assembly
of the Statute of the Permanent Court 258, 264, 266 [hereinafter PCIJ Documents]
with ICJ STATUTE, supra note 284, arts. 38(1)(d), 59. The adoption of the wording that
became these articles was preceded by the submission of a memorandum by the British
delegate observing that the PCIJ's decisions must necessarily have the effect of
"moulding and modifying international law." PCIJ Documents, supra, at 42, 44; Note on
the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice, id. at 38 (expressing the opinion that this
development was not contemplated by the Covenant of the League of Nations). The
memorandum went on to suggest that there ought to be a mechanism whereby a state
could make a protest against changes in international law that might flow from a
particular decision. Id. The memorandum described such a mechanism as particularly
necessary because non-members of the League of Nations, including the United States,
Germany, and the Soviet Union, could "not be expected to take their views on
international law from the court's decision." Id. A report prepared by the French
representative to the Council of the League, and adopted by that body, makes clear
that the adoption of what became Article 59 was seen as a response to the concern that
states not parties to a case could nonetheless be affected by the decision of that case if
the PCIJ's decisions were seen as a source of law generally. Id. at 45. More specifically,
that report indicates that Article 59 was intended to make explicit that states not
parties to a given case were not bound by the PCIJ's legal pronouncements in that case.
Id. at 50. It is true that a subcommittee of the Third Committee of the Assembly of the
League rejected an Argentine amendment to what became Article 38 that would have
limited "the power of the court to attribute the character of precedents to judicial
decisions" because the subcommittee "considered that it would be one of the Court's
important tasks to contribute, through its jurisprudence, to the development of
international law." Report and Draft Scheme Presented to the Assembly by the Third
Committee id. at 206, 211. But it goes too far to say that the rejection of this
amendment should be seen as indicating that the PCIJ was intended to have the
capacity, through its decisions, to make law. As indicated above, the language of
Articles 38(4) and 59 was clearly drafted to preclude that result, and the subcommittee

JUDGES AND INTERNATIONAL LA W

2003]

1523

the ICJ was not intended to have the capacity to make law through
its decisions:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the
United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation,
the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a.

the interpretation of a treaty;

b.

any question of international law;

c.
the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach
of an international obligation.
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or
on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for
a certain time....
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the
29 3
matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.

The effect of this article is to limit the ICJ's jurisdiction to states that
have voluntarily accepted its authority, either by recognizing its
"compulsory" jurisdiction prior to the development of a dispute or by
referring a case to the court after the dispute has arisen. 294 States did
not afford the ICJ the authority to compel an unwilling litigant state
to appear before it. The court, in other words, is not intended to be
able to impose its views on the international community. But if the
ICJ's decisions are seen as sources of law, then states unwilling to
appear before the court are indirectly subjected to its authority,
strongly curtailing the protection for state autonomy created in
Article 36.
Article 94 of the Charter supports the same conclusion. That
article provides:
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a
party.

did not alter that language. Further, the Argentine amendment would have limited the
PCIJ to applying only national judicial decisions, and those only against the state of
the court delivering the decision. Id. at 68. That is, the amendment would have had the
effect of forbidding the PCIJ to look to its own decisions even as subsidiary means for
determining rules of law. Given the highly restrictive character of the amendment, its
rejection hardly implies the intention to adopt a very expansive view of the effect of the
PCIJ's decisions.
293.
ICJ STATUTE, supra note 284, art. 36.
294.
Id.
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2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon
it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary,
make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give
295
effect to the judgment.

In other words, a state prevailing before the ICJ has no legal
right to execution of the judgment in its favor.2 96 On the contrary,
whether to enforce the judgment is entirely a matter of the discretion
of the Security Council. 29 7 If the ICJ's decisions were understood to be
sources of law, binding on the international community, such
discretion would be meaningless. This follows, since the states
composing the Security Council would presumably be as obliged to
accept the view of the law taken by the court as any other non-parties
to a case in which a particular rule was established. Yet if they were
so bound, how could they lawfully elect to reject the application of a
binding legal rule in the case in which execution was sought? If,
however, Article 94 actually confers discretion on the Security
Council, it must follow that the Council's members not parties to a
particular case decided by the ICJ are not bound by any legal rules
the court purports to enunciate in that case. If they are not bound,
neither are any other non-parties. In short, Article 94 is inconsistent
with the argument that the ICJ's decisions are sources of law.
It is true that the court itself puts considerable weight on its own
298
prior decisions, and some of its judges have defended this practice.

295.
U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
296.
Id.
297.
Id.
298.
See generally lain Scobbie, Res Judicata, Precedent and the International
Court:A PreliminarySketch, 20 AusTL. Y. B. INT'L L. 299 (1999); Mohammed Bedjaoui,

Expediency in the Decisions of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 71 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
1 (2001). In particular, Judge Shahabuddeen of the ICJ has argued that ICJ decisions
may properly be considered a precedent, at least when that body decides cases.
MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 238-39 (1996). However,

the heart of his argument is that the members of the Council of the League of Nations
who produced the final draft of the PCIJ's statute were aware that the Court's
decisions would create precedents, but adopted the statute anyway. Id. at 56-63. More
specifically, he argues that Article 59 means only that a judgment can be enforced only
against a state which was a party to the litigation which produced the judgment. Id.
This conclusion is hard to square with the drafting history of the statute (which Judge
Shahabuddeen describes at length). Article 59 was added after the British note
asserted the undesirability of states not parties to litigation before the PCIJ being held
bound by rules of law developed by that court, and was characterized by the French
representative as dispositive of that concern, Again, if that article was intended only to
indicate that non-parties to a case were not affected by the judgment, it would have
been unnecessary to add to Article 59 the phrase "and only in respect of that particular
case," since, according to Judge Shahabuddeen, all the article purports to address is
the effect of individual judgments. However, that phrase makes sense if the article is
intended to emphasize the non-precedential character of the Court's decisions, since
parties to a case would be as vulnerable to its use as a precedent as would other states.
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Scholars, too, frequently cite decisions of the ICJ as though they
2 99
were, in themselves, authority for particular propositions of law.
Additionally, as noted above, at least one U.S. court has relied on an
ICJ judgment as authority supporting its holding.3 00 However, not
only do the ICJ's basic documents cast great doubt on the authority of
its decisions, but at least one other international tribunal has
repeatedly held that it is not bound by the ICJ's view of international
30 1
law.
It was the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) which took this position in the following context.
In Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid, the appeals chamber of the ICTY was
faced with a case in which, among other issues, the prosecution
appealed the trial chamber's apparent conclusion that certain of the
crimes of which the defendant was accused were not covered by the
relevant treaty because the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not
international.3 0 2 Whether that determination was correct depended
on whether the acts of Bosnian Serb forces could be attributed to
Yugoslavia, which in turn depended on the degree of control
Yugoslavia was required to maintain over those forces in order to
303
satisfy the international legal requirements for such attribution.

Further, as Judge Shahabuddeen does not note, the phrase "[s]ubject to the provisions
of Article 59" was added to what is now Article 38(1)(d) at the same time that Article 59
was added to the statute. PCIJ Documents, supra note 292, at 42, 44. That phrase
makes sense in context only if it is intended to emphasize that reliance on the court's
judicial decisions, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law, is subject
to the limitation that its decisions bind only the parties to a case, and only for that
case.
Judge Shahabuddeen observes that one might distinguish between the law-making
capacity of municipal courts and that of the ICJ on the ground that municipal courts
are invested with the sovereignty of the states which establish them. SHAHABUDDEEN,
supra, at 93. He argues that the states of the world can be seen as having delegated
law-making authority to the ICJ as a function of establishing that court. Id. That
assertion, however, overlooks the implications of the ICJ's lack of compulsory
jurisdiction and the fact that its judgments are enforceable only at the discretion of the
Security Council. In contrast, municipal courts can compel the appearance of litigants
and executive authorities have no discretion not to execute their judgments. That is,
municipal courts themselves possess the essence of sovereignty, the power to coerce
obedience. In contrast, the ICJ was denied any coercive powers by governmentssurely an indication that they intended that it not exercise anything like sovereign
power.
299.
For examples of scholarly reliance on ICJ decisions as establishing rules of
CIL see, e.g., J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW passim (10th ed.
1989); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW passim (4th ed. 1997); Anthea
Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation,95 A.J.I.L. 757 (2001).
300.
Siderman de Blake v. Repub. of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied 507 U.S. 1017 (1993).
301.
See generally Prosecutor v. Du~ko Tadi6, 38 I.L.M. 1518 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo.-App. Chamber 1999).
302.
Id. 22, at 1523-24, 9 68-74, at 1533-34, T 80-82, at 1535, 86, at 1535.
303.
Id. 97, at 1537.
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According to the prosecution, the trial chamber had erred by drawing
the legal standards for attribution from the Nicaragua v. United
States case. 30 4 The appeals chamber agreed, holding that the test
drawn from that case was not persuasive. 30 5 It based this conclusion
on its determination that the result in Nicaragua v. United States
was consistent neither with the bases of the law of state
responsibility nor with the practice of states and international and
national tribunals.306
In Prosecutor v. Delali6,30 7 the appeals chamber faced the same
legal issue, with the defendants in that case arguing that the Tadi6
court had erred in refusing to follow the ICJ's holding in the
Nicaragua case because the appeals chamber was "bound by the ICJ's
precedent.130 8 The appeals chamber did not accept that argument,
stating that:
[T]his Tribunal is an autonomous international judicial body, and
although the ICJ is the "principal judicial organ" within the United
Nations system to which the Tribunal belongs, there is no hierarchical
relationship between the two courts. Although the Appeals Chamber
will necessarily take into consideration other decisions of international
courts, it may, after careful consideration, come to a different
309
conclusion.

The ICTY, in short, has flatly rejected the argument that ICJ
decisions give rise to binding legal rules. Rather, it has held that the
ICJ is to be followed only to the extent its decisions make sense and
correspond to the practice of states. This treatment of the ICJ
contrasts sharply with the scholarly practice of treating ICJ decisions
as establishing legal rules without regard to their coherence and
3 10
correspondence to practice.
The authority of the ICTY is, if anything, less doubtful than that
of the ICJ. While it has had limited success in actually obtaining
custody over persons it has indicted, its jurisdiction does not depend
on consent, either from defendants before it or from their home
31
states. Formally, at least, its jurisdiction is compulsory. '

304.
Id. 7 99-101, at 1537-38.
305.
Id.
115, at 1540.
306.
Id.
116-45, at 1540-46.
307.
Prosecutor v. Delali6, 40 I.L.M. 630 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo.-App.
Chamber 2001).
308.
Id.
21, at 635.
309.
Id.
24, at 636 (footnote omitted).
310.
See supranote 299.
311.
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, arts. 1, 6, 9, 29, U.N. Doc. S/25704
at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council on May 25,
1993, U.N. SCOR, 48th year., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), as amended by S.C. Res.
1166, U.N. SCOR, 53d year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998); S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR,
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Furthermore, the ICTY is empowered by its statute to impose
sentences and to select the facility in which the sentences are to be
served. 3 12 That is, the carrying out of its judgments is not subject to
the discretion of any political body, and its authority actually to
resolve the cases brought before it is thus unquestioned. 313 When
such a court explains the law guiding its decisions, it would be
unreasonable simply to ignore that explanation.
Yet, if these ICTY rulings are taken seriously, they necessarily
cast doubt on any reliance on ICJ decisions simply because they are
ICJ decisions. Rather, however inconvenient it may be for scholars
and domestic courts, the holdings in these ICTY cases seriously
weaken any argument that those ICJ decisions on CIL that are poorly
reasoned or contrary to state practice are entitled to any deference.
We see, then, that limitations on the authority of particular
international tribunals cast doubt on arguments that the decisions of
all such tribunals are a source of international law. But that is not
the only factor counseling caution in dealing with the law-creating
effect of decisions of international tribunals. Another is the problem
of legal mistakes. This is not to say that judges of international
tribunals are somehow more prone to error than are judges of
domestic courts. It is to say that correcting such errors is so much
more difficult in the international system than in a domestic system
that formal action to change a rule relied upon in a doubtful decision
may take a long time, even if the decision is understood to be
questionable as soon as it is announced. A U.S. judge who seizes upon
that decision without examining the reaction of states may thus find
itself applying an incorrect legal standard.
This difficulty follows from the nature of the international legal
system. As a practical matter, the only way to alter a rule of
international law is to create a treaty regime, the rules of which will
supersede any pre-existing rule. But a treaty binds only the states
accepting it. Thus, if the rule to be changed is one that affects a large
number of states, the group of states which must reach consensus on
a rule-changing treaty will be correspondingly large. But convening a
diplomatic conference and negotiating agreement among a large
number of governments is a very complicated process. It is

55th year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000); S.C. Res. 1411, U.N. SCOR, 57th year, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1411 (2002).
Id. arts. 23, 24, 27.
312.
313.
The ICTY is not the only international tribunal whose judgments are
actually enforceable. For example, money judgments against in a state rendered by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights are enforceable in the courts of the state
against which the judgment was rendered. American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 62, 68, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. In other words, U.S. judges should not
assume that all international tribunals have been kept on a leash as short as that
attached to the ICJ. Rather, it is necessary to examine the situation of each such
judicial body in order to determine the scope of authority of the entity in question.
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necessarily more difficult than amending a domestic statute which a
court has interpreted in a way contrary to the legislature's views on
the subject because the legislature can act by majority vote;
unanimity is not required.
Obviously, before states will undertake the effort of convening
such a conference, they must be convinced that the effort is
necessary. A decision by an international court, even if perceived as
incorrect, will by no means necessarily be seen as a sufficient reason
to take on the burden of convening a conference. States may simply
ignore the decision. 314 After all, and as noted above, the ICJ has
limited means for compelling states to follow the rules it lays down,
and cannot even insure the execution of its judgments. So, for
example, when the ICJ concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the
claim brought against the United States by Nicaragua with respect to
the activities of the contras, 315 the United States simply withdrew
from the proceedings, arguing that the Court's conclusion that it had
jurisdiction was entirely wrong. 316 In summary, both because of
limitations in their authority imposed by the instruments
establishing them, and because any errors they make may not be
formally corrected, U.S. courts should react cautiously to suggestions
that they rely on the opinions of international tribunals as sources of
rules of CIL.

V. A SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE

The foregoing discussion underlines the problems with the
reliance by U.S. courts on many of the sources to which they might
expect to turn, when confronted with a case involving international
law. It might reasonably be asked, what is a judge supposed to do
when faced with such a case? The judge cannot simply refuse to
decide, and if much scholarly writing, the Restatement, and domestic

314.
Indeed, the reaction of the European Union to a degree of perceived
overreaching by the European Court of Justice is a contrary example which proves the
point in the text. The judgments of that court interpreting the various legal
instruments of the European Union are enforceable in the domestic legal systems of
the member states of the Union. Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 187, 192, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 78, 79. Thus, when that
court handed down rulings seen as encroaching on national prerogatives, the member
states had no alternative to adopting various substantive and procedural measures in
order to rein in that court. See Karen J. Alter, The European Union's Legal System and
Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?, 54 INT'L ORG. 489, 512-15 (2000).
315.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov.
26).
316.
Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by
Nicaraguain the InternationalCourt of Justice, 24 I.L.M. 246, 247 (1985).
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and international court decisions, are unavailable to instruct the
judge in the law to apply, it would seem that the judge is in an
impossible position.
Fortunately, that need not be true, at least with respect to
human rights issues, the international legal questions that come
before U.S. courts most frequently. In matters involving CIL, the
court in The Paquete Habana held that if a U.S. court must decide a
case involving international law, but has no treaty, statute, or
controlling executive or judicial act upon which to rely, "resort must
be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations. 3' 17 We now
have available extensive collections of the actual practice of states
regarding human rights, published frequently by trustworthy
organizations. For example, Professor Hathaway was able to rely on
four sources of information regarding states' human rights practices
in her study of the effectiveness of human rights treaties: "the Center
for International Development and Conflict Management at the
University of Maryland, College Park, the United States Department
of State Country Reports on Human Rights, Freedom House's Annual
Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, and the InterParliamentary Union. 3 18 From data drawn from these sources, she
was able to reach conclusions regarding the performance of 166 states
with respect to genocide, torture, civil liberty, fair and public trials,
and the political rights of women.3 19 In other words, the lack of
collections of state practice which forced Justice Gray to look to
scholarly writings to determine the customs and usages of civilized
nations has, with respect to human rights matters, been remedied.
Thus, the data judges need to address questions of state practice
regarding human rights is available. This is not to say that using
such information is easy; indeed, so much material may be available
that sorting through it may be difficult. However, judges are able to
deal with other types of voluminous material with the assistance of
counsel, and there is no reason to think that counsel could not
similarly guide a court through, for example, the State Department's
annual report on human rights. That is, judges facing the need to
decide questions involving the international law of human rights can
ignore the materials which this article suggests are questionable
without losing the basis for a reasoned decision.

317.
318.
319.

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
Hathaway, supra note 221, at 1967.
Id. at 1965, 1967.
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VI. CONCLUSION

As the foregoing discussion has shown, a U.S. judge faced with a
question of CIL is in an unenviable position when it comes to
determining the content of the law. While he will presumably
understand that CIL is created by state behavior, he may be tempted
to treat CIL as he would other bodies of uncodified law. Normally, in
such cases, the judge can look for guidance to decisions by other
judges. As demonstrated above, however, judicial decisions are
questionable sources of international legal rules. If decisions of
international tribunals are in question, the authority of their
precedents is uncertain; if U.S. decisions are the focus, the judge
must accept that the earlier decision was probably made by someone
just as unfamiliar with CIL.
A judge who seeks guidance from scholars, or from compilations
such as the Restatement, is also running a risk. Both scholars and the
Restatement have an unsettling tendency to blur the lines between
rules accepted as binding by governments and rules which, it could be
argued, ought to be imposed on governments. Thus, the judge will
find that the only way to determine the state behavior that creates
CIL is by examining that behavior-and that will involve a difficult
and time-consuming factual inquiry.
But the judge's frustrations are likely to be compounded by the
facts of the case. Most CIL cases in U.S. courts involve human rights
matters; they involve allegations that the defendant(s) has engaged
in behavior most Americans would find reprehensible. The judge's
effort to determine the content of the law, therefore, will be an
attempt to find out whether the defendant's alleged horrible act is not
merely morally repugnant, but unlawful. There will be a natural
tendency to strain to find illegal that which the judge is likely to
believe is clearly wrong.
Cases involving the jus cogens concept will be particularly
difficult. Since the acts purportedly forbidden by rules alleged to be of
jus cogens status are especially heinous, the judge is likely to want to
be able to conclude that such acts are illegal. Further, to the extent
the jus cogens concept is treated as including rules whose binding
character does not depend on state practice, the judge will face the
temptation to avoid the complicated factual inquiry otherwise
necessary in a CIL case by embracing the jus cogens concept.
This paper is an attempt to defend the proposition that, despite
all this, the judge should insist that litigants contending for the
existence of a particular rule of CIL show that their rule is reflected
by a general practice of states. Ultimately, the argument comes down
to a question of legitimacy. Almost inevitably in a CIL case, a U.S.
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judge will be asked to evaluate the legality of acts taken in other
countries by the officials of those countries. The methods of
determining the content of CIL, employed by most of the courts
discussed in this paper, share one basic defect: they make it easy to
apply the label "international law" to rules the actual international
standing of which is most uncertain. For a court to stigmatize foreign
acts as contrary to international standards when those standards are
not clear does not simply pose the risk of creating foreign policy
difficulties for the United States. More fundamentally, by relying on
sources other than state behavior to determine the content of CIL, a
court effectively transfers legislative power to groups with little right
to claim it-such as judges of international tribunals whose authority
is carefully circumscribed in their founding instruments-or no right
at all-such as legal academics. The court is doing so, moreover, when
the question involves not rules governing persons normally subject to
the judge's authority, but rules used to evaluate the conduct of
persons who would not in most circumstances be subject to control by
a U.S. court.
The framing of rules of law is necessarily a political act. The
ultimate problem with efforts to shift the focus in CIL determinations
from state practice to something else is that the something else,
whatever it is, will lack any sort of political legitimacy. Surely rules
deriving from illegitimate sources are a shaky basis for any body of
law; they are especially undesirable when a court in one country
claims to be speaking for the world.
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